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Failure Predicting Model for Oil Pipelines 
Bassem Abdrabou 
 
Oil and gas pipelines are considered the safest means to transport petroleum products 
comparing to railway and highway transportations. They transport millions of dollars’ worth 
of goods every day. However, accidents happen every year and some of these accidents 
inflict catastrophic impact on the environment and result in great economic loss. In order to 
maintain safety of the pipelines, several inspection techniques have been developed in the 
last decades. Despite the accuracy of these techniques, they are very costly and time 
consuming. Similarly, several failure predicting and condition assessment models have been 
developed in the last decade; however, most of these models are limited to one type of 
failure, such as corrosion failure, or mainly depend on expert opinion which makes their 
output seemingly subjective. 
The present research develops an objective model of failure prediction for oil pipelines 
depending on the available historical data on pipelines' accidents. Two approaches were used 
to fulfill this objective: the artificial neural network (ANN) and the Multi Nomial Logit 
(MNL). The ANN is used to develop a model to predict failure due to mechanical, corrosion 
or third party, which collectively account for 88% of oil pipeline accidents. This model had a 
prediction accuracy of 68.5%. Another ANN model is developed to predict only corrosion or 
third party failure with a prediction accuracy of 72.2%. The Average Validity Percentage 
(AVP) for the two models is 73.7 and 72.8, respectively. 
The MNL approach is used to develop a model that predicts failures caused by mechanical, 
corrosion or third party elements with a prediction accuracy of 68.4% and Pseudo R Squared 
of 0.42. The Average Validity Percentage (AVP) for this MNL approach is 73.7%. This 
model also generates a probability equation for each type of failure. 
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The three developed models show convincing results, since they are based on solid historical 
failure data for the last 38 years, with no subjectivity or ambiguity. These models could 
easily be used by oil pipeline operators to identify the type of failure threatening each 
pipeline so that appropriate preventive and corrective measures can be planned. The models 
also help to prioritize in-line inspection of different pipeline segments according to the 
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Pipelines are the backbone of the oil industry; they transport millions of dollars’ worth of 
goods every day. While pipelines are considered to be the safest way to transport petroleum 
products, compared to rail and highway transportation, some pipeline accidents could have 
catastrophic environmental impact and severe economic lose (Dey, et al., 2004). According 
to the CONCAWE (a European associate of oil companies that investigates environmental, 
health and safety issues) pipeline failure occurs due to the following: mechanical, 
operational causes, corrosion, third-party activity and natural hazards. The CONCAWE 
organization was established in 1963 to carry out environmental research related to the oil 
industry. Most of the European oil companies are now members of CONCAWE 
(CONCAWE, 2010).  
Over the last 20 years, several new inspection techniques have been developed to detect 
pipeline anomalies or defects without stopping production (or flow), such as Magnetic Flux 
Leakage (MFL) or Ultrasonic testing (UT). While these techniques are effective, they are 
costly and time consuming. As an example, for the DOLPHIN PIPLINE in Qatar it costs 
260,000 dollars (US) and takes one week to inspect an 80 km pipeline using the MFL 
technique (Husein, 2011). The high costs in time and money for these techniques have 
encouraged researchers to develop condition assessment models (or failure prediction 
models) for oil pipelines to prioritize inspections and to identify the actions that need to be 




1.2 Problem Statement and Research Objectives 
More than 60 countries have oil and gas pipeline networks exceeding 2000 km; the longest 
pipeline network is located in the United States of America followed by Russia (Goodland, 
2005). These huge networks transporting such a dangerous product must be in safe working 
condition to avoid catastrophic accidents. Mandatory frequent inspections are required to 
maintain these networks. While pipeline inspection techniques have developed to provide 
very accurate results, they are very expensive and time consuming. Therefore, most pipeline 
operators use condition assessment models to prioritize inspection, set a reasonably 
economical inspection interval and assure that they will take suitable precautions against 
failure. 
Most of the current models are either dependent on expert opinions, which makes them 
subjective, or they are limited to evaluating only one type of failure. Therefore, a more 
robust objective model is needed, one that can use historical data to predict the failure type 
menacing a section of oil pipeline. This model would help pipeline operators to take the 
necessary actions to mitigate the risk that threatens a pipeline. 
The main objective of the current research is to provide an impartial failure prediction model 
for oil pipelines that is capable of identifying the failure type menacing a pipeline by 
knowing some basic pipeline attributes. The developed model is able to predict the failure 
type threatening a pipeline from among the main three failure causes (mechanical, corrosion 
and third-party), which together cause 88% of oil pipeline accidents according to 
CONCAWE (Davis, et al., 2010). 
The sub-objectives of this research may be summarized as follows: 
 Identity and study the main failure causes of pipelines 
 Identify the pipeline factors that contribute to pipeline failure 
 Develop a failure prediction model for oil pipelines 
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1.3 Research Methodology  
This research aims at developing a failure prediction model for oil pipelines. This model will 
allow oil pipeline operators to take those actions required to protect pipelines against the 
threats predicted and to prioritize inspections. The following procedure was carried out to 
achieve this objective.  
1.3.1 Literature review  
A comprehensive literature review was prepared, which includes information on different 
types of oil and gas pipelines, types of pipeline failure, a review of the effect of pipeline 
attributes on types of failure, a review of the recent studies for oil and gas pipeline condition 
assessment, a review of the various inspection techniques and a presentation of the Artificial 
Neural Network ANN and the Multinomial Logit Model techniques. 
1.3.2 Data Collection 
Historical data were collected from the CONCAWE report published in 2010. That report 
contains summaries of all of the oil pipeline accidents in Europe over the last 38 years, 
including the causes of failure and some pipeline characteristics. The collected data were 
processed by the following steps. First, all the accidents that had missing data were 
eliminated.  Two data sets were then prepared. The first set includes all the accidents caused 
by mechanical, corrosion or third-party failure. The second data set contains the accidents 
caused by corrosion failure and third-party failure. These two sets were used two develop 
two different models. 
1.3.3 Development of Failure Prediction Model 
Three failure models are developed: 
 An Artificial Neural Network (ANN) model that predicts failure caused by 
mechanical failure, corrosion failure or third-party failure (3 outputs); 
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 An Artificial Neural Network (ANN) model to predict failure caused by corrosion 
failure or third party-failure (2 outputs);  
 A Multinomial Logit (MNL) model that can predict failure caused by mechanical 
failure, corrosion failure or third-party failure (3 outputs). 
1.4 Thesis Organization 
To accomplish the research objectives, a literature review illustrating condition rating 
models for oil and gas pipeline types is represented in chapter 2. The literature review covers 
the oil and gas pipeline types, the types of pipeline failures, factors contributing to pipeline 
failures, and inspection techniques. Chapter 2 also includes an overview of Artificial Neural 
Network techniques and presents the Multinomial Logit technique. 
Chapter 3 provides an overview of the research methodology including a layout for building 
the ANN and the MNL models. 
Chapter 4 contains the data collection and data preparation procedures, a description of the 
different data sets used for the different models and the exclusion method deployed for the 
random samples used for validation purposes are also presented. 
Chapter 5 describes the development of two ANN models; it identifies the inputs and the 
outputs of each model, explains the models’ development and presents the training and tests 
utilized for each model. It also shows the validation process and the sensitivity analysis for 
each model. 
Chapter 6 illustrates the development of the MNL failure prediction model, including the 
model evaluation and validation processes. This chapter also includes a sensitivity analysis 
for the developed model. 
Chapter 7 presents the conclusion, including the limitations of the developed models, the 




2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Overview 
This chapter consists of seven parts. Section 2.2 presents a literature review on the different 
types of petroleum pipelines and their characteristics.  Section 2.3 demonstrates the main 
causes of failure, such as mechanical failure, corrosion failure, operational failure, natural 
hazards, and third party failure. Section 2.4 illustrates the factors that contribute to 
petroleum pipeline deterioration. These factors are classified according to the failure 
category that they contribute to. Section 2.5 provides a literature review of current practices 
followed by pipeline line operators to assess the condition of existing pipelines. Section 2.6 
presents a literature review of the current practices for inspecting oil and gas pipelines. This 
includes direct inspection methods, which are divided into in-line inspection and external 
inspection. This subsection also shows how most pipeline operators manipulate with the 
inspection data to help them make maintenance decisions. Section 2.7 provides a literature 
review of the failure prediction and condition assessment models for oil and gas pipelines 
developed to date. Section 2.8 and 2.9 present an extensive literature review on logistic 
regression analysis modeling and artificial neural network (ANN) analysis respectively and 
their application. 
2.2 Petroleum Pipeline Material and Specifications 
Pipelines are the back bone of the petroleum industry. They can be classified by the type of 
product they transport: crude oil, natural gas and products pipelines (Canadian Energy 
Pipeline Association, 2007). Most major pipelines are made of steel with diameters that vary 
from 8 to 47 inches, while distributive pipelines are mostly made of plastic with small 
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diameters of up to only 2 inches. In this research we are concerned with main oil pipelines, 
which are made of steel that can be of  different steel grades (grade B to grade X90) and that 
operate at various pressures (10 to 220 bar) (Ali, 2011). 
2.2.1 Pipeline Types 
There are five major types of pipeline, classified according to their usage (Hopkins, 2002): 
Flow lines and gathering lines: are usually small and short pipelines that transport crude 
product to the processing facilities. Their diameter varies from 2" to 6" and they are made of 
carbon steel. 
Feeder lines: these transport oil or gas from a processing facility or storage to the main line. 
The diameter can be up to 20”, and they are composed of carbon steel. 
Transmission lines: these are the main conduits of transported oil and gas, and can reach a 
diameter of 56”. These lines are usually very long and are made of carbon steel. 
Product lines:  carry refined products from refineries to distribution centers. They are also 
made of carbon steel. 
Distribution lines:  are used for local distribution and function at low pressure. Their 
diameter can be up to 6 “, and they are made of cast iron or plastic. 
2.2.2 Pipeline Material 
As mentioned earlier, main pipelines are made of carbon steel. Carbon steel pipelines are 
manufactured according to the American Petroleum Institute (API 1994-2004), the 
American Society of Mechanical Engineer (ASME), the American National Standard 
Institute (ANSI) and the American Society of Testing Materials (ASTM) standards (Pharris, 
et al., 2007). There are two ways of manufacturing main pipelines; seamlessly, which means 
fabricated without longitudinal welds, or welded. Welded pipes can be spirally welded or 
longitudinally welded (Mikhail, 2011). The pipes are transported to the construction site 
certified by the manufacturer, and then they are welded together to form the pipeline 
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network (Hasan, 2011). The steel grade varies from grade A to grade X 80. The higher the 
grade, the higher the yield stresses as shown in figure 2.1. Usually higher grade steel is used 
for high-pressure pipeline and offshore pipeline. One problem with these pipelines is that 
pipelines made of high-grade steel require special welds. Also high steel grades are highly 
affected by the existence of impurities, especially H2S. Generally, oil and gas are mixed 
with some impurities when extracted from the field. These impurities increase the risk of 
internal corrosion. The most common impurities are cited below (Mikhail, 2011): 
H2S (sour gas): H2S forms sulphuric acid in the presence of water, which then causes 
pitting, lamination and corrosion. 
CO2:  When exposed to water, CO2 forms carbonic acid, a highly corrosive acid. 
Chlorides: chlorides are highly corrosive substances. 
 
Figure 2-1 Overview of the Yield Stress and the Impact Toughness for Oil and Gas Pipeline 
(Hopkins, 2002) 
2.3 Types of Oil Pipeline Failure 
The Oil Companies' European Association for Environmental, Health and Safety issues in 
Refining and Distribution, CONCOWE, lists several types of failure for oil pipeline. The 
CONCAWE was established in 1963 by a group of leading oil companies to carry out 
research on environmental issues related to the oil industry. The CONCAWE publishes 
reports and collects and analyses pipeline accidents in Europe. The following section shows 
the main types of pipeline failure according to the CONCAWE (Davis, et al., 2010) . 
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2.3.1 Mechanical Failure 
Mechanical failure includes all failure due to poor construction or the usage of low quality 
materials (Dey, 2004). Mechanical failure may be divided into two categories, dents and 
gouges, that appear as deformation in the pipe wall and which are sites where cracks 
develop. Dents are radial deformations, while a gouge follows along surface deformation. 
These defects usually occur during the construction phase. Mechanical damage can cause 
immediate failure, delayed failure or no failure, depending on the severity of damages. 
Presently the most common way to detect mechanical damage is by performing In-line 
Inspection (ILI), such as Ultrasound Pig or Magnetic Flux Pig (Panetta , et al., 2001).  
2.3.2 Corrosion Failure 
Corrosion is formed because of the tendency of manufactured metals to revert to their 
original mineral form; this process is usually very slow. Corrosion causes a loss of pipeline 
wall metal that could lead to failure. Corrosion failure is considered the second-most 
common cause of pipeline failure after third-party interference. To evaluate the change 
potential of corrosion, the type of corrosion should be clearly identified. There are three 
main types of corrosion, as presented below (Muhlbauer, 2004).  
a. External Corrosion 
External corrosion could be an atmospheric corrosion for above-ground pipeline 
components exposed to the atmosphere.  This is a rare failure mechanism due to the slow 
rate of the atmospheric mechanism. External corrosion can also occur because of subsurface 
corrosion in buried pipelines. Subsurface corrosion is more dangerous than atmospheric 
corrosion due to the complicated mechanism underlying this corrosion. Subsurface 





b. Internal Corrosion 
This type of corrosion attacks the inner surface of a pipeline. It is less severe than subsurface 
corrosion but more dangerous than atmospheric corrosion. It is typically a function of the 
product being transported by the pipeline (Ali, 2011). 
c. Stress Crack Corrosion. 
Stress crack corrosion is a type of corrosion induced from the combined influence of the 
tensile stress and the corrosive environment (Cotis, 2011). 
2.3.3 Third-Party Activity and External Interference 
Third party failure is a result of any damage caused by people who are not associated with a 
pipeline. This includes undetected accidents, and can result in a failure at any later point 
(Davis, et al., 2010). The US Department of Transportation (DOT) pipeline statistics show 
that third-party activities are the major cause of pipeline failure. 20 to 40 percent of all 
pipeline failures are caused by third-party damages.  Despite this reality, third-party damage 
is the least-considered factor in pipeline hazard assessment (Muhlbauer, 2004). There are 
many factors that can affect the occurrence of third-party damage, such as the type of land 
use, pipeline location, political instability and its accessibility. These factors are discussed 
later in this chapter. 
2.3.4 Operational Failure 
Operational failure results from operational upsets: the malfunction or inadequacy of one or 
more safeguarding systems or operators’ error (Bersani, et al., 2010). Operational failure is 
considered to be one of the more rare causes of pipeline failure, although it can cause 
catastrophic consequences. Eighty percent of operational failure is caused by human error. 
This type of failure could be significantly reduced by regularly performing safety programs 
and providing extensive training as well as drug testing of pipeline operators. Up-to-date 




2.3.5 Natural hazards 
Natural hazards rarely cause pipeline failure, but they still should be considered in failure 
assessment because of their implications on public safety. Natural hazards include flooding, 
land movement, volcanic activity and earthquakes, all of which can severely damage a 
pipeline and the environment in most cases, geotechnical and hydro-technical studies are 
performed prior to pipeline construction.   
The list above includes all the types of failure that could happen to a steel oil pipeline. 
Figure 2.2 represents the percentage of occurrence of each type of these failures for the last 
38 years in the European pipeline system according to CONCAWE’s data. The chart shows 
that 88% of accidents were caused either by mechanical failure, corrosion failure or third-
party failure. Each of these types of failure could be affected by a number of factors, which 
means that researchers must investigate all the available pipeline parameters that could 
contribute to failure. The following section presents the pipeline parameters that contribute 
to the afore-mentioned types of failures.  
 
Figure 2-2  Percentages of  Oïl Pipeline Failure Causes (Davis, et al., 2010) 
2.4 Factors Contributing to Oil and Gas Pipeline Failure 














factors, and all these factors should be taken into account in order to know the weight of 
their individual contribution to the pipeline deterioration. These factors are the pillars of any 
prediction model or risk-based inspection model. The model illustrated by (Muhlbauer, 
2004) classifies factors contributing to oil pipeline failure according to the type of failure 
they may cause.  In this section we will present these factors according to Muhlbauer’s 
classification system which is shown in figure 2.3. 
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Pipeline Failure
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Figure 2-3 Types of factors Contributing to Pipeline Failure (Muhlbauer, 2004) 
2.4.1 Factors Contributing to Third-Party Damages 
a. Minimum Depth of Cover 
The minimum cover depth highly affects the risk of third-party damage. Shallow buried 
pipeline is vulnerable to damage due to contractor excavation. The type of soil above the 
pipeline (sand, rock, etc.) and the type of pavement (if any) above (or close to) it could also 
affect the risk of third-party damage. The presence of burial warning tape, concrete coating 
or concrete slabs decreases the risk of third-party damage. In case of submerged pipeline, the 




b. Activity Level 
The activity level, in terms of its effect on a pipeline, may be represented by population 
density. The presence of highways with heavy trucks or railways could apply an excessive 
load on buried pipelines. Other buried infrastructures could also cause threats because of 
their own need for excavations and maintenance. With submerged pipelines, the presence of 
ships and submarines could be a threat. 
c. Line Locating 
Line locating is a program that specifies the exact location of buried pipelines, thereby 
allowing third-party excavation to be conducted safely without risk of pipeline damage. The 
One Call System is a service that receives information about any digging activity and in turn 
notifies all owners of the affected underground facilities. These services decrease the risk of 
third-party failure. (Muhlbauer, 2004) 
d. Public Education Program 
A good public education program decreases the chance of third-party failure. This could be 
achieved by mailings and/or meetings with local contractors, as well as media publicity, 
(Public Service Announcements PSAs, billboards, etc.)  (Muhlbauer, 2004). 
e. Right-Of-Way Condition 
This parameter measures the recognisability of a pipeline corridor.  Pipeline corridors should 
be clearly indicated by appropriate clear signs to reduce third-party interruption. 
f. Patrol Frequency 
The frequency and the effectiveness of patrols should be considered in certain locations, as it 
can play an important role in reducing the risk of third-party damage and vandalism.  
g. Pipeline Diameter 
Pipeline diameter can contribute to third-party failure (Bersani, 2010), as small-diameter 
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pipelines are more vulnerable to damage than larger ones (Ali, 2011). 
2.4.2 Factors Contributing to Corrosion Failure 
Corrosion failure could be caused by three different types of corrosion: atmospheric 
corrosion, internal corrosion and subsurface corrosion. Each types of corrosion are affected 
by several factors. In the factors contributing to each type of corrosion is cited showing how 
it could affect corrosion failure. 
2.4.2.1 Factors Affecting Atmospheric Corrosion 
a. Atmospheric Exposure 
Specific atmospheric characteristics affect atmospheric corrosion. Chemical composition 
could be air-borne naturally, such as salt and CO2, or manmade, as are chlorine and SO2. 
High temperatures and especially high humidity increase the chance and the rate of 
corrosion. 
b. Atmospheric Coating 
This factor describes the preventive precautions taken to minimise the chance of 
atmospheric corrosion. The age and condition of a coating have a great impact on corrosion 
prevention (Muhlbauer, 2004).  
2.4.2.2 Factors Affecting Internal Corrosion 
a. Product Corrodibility 
This factor presents the relative corrosiveness of the pipeline content. Threats may be posed 
by product incompatibility with the pipeline material or the existence of corrosive impurities 
that migrate into the product. The corrodibility of a product may be categorized by the level 
of corrosiveness, as shown by  Muhlbauer (2004): 
Strongly corrosive:  product that contains water, H2S etc. 
Mildly corrosive:  corrosion exists, but proceeds at a slow rate. 
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Corrosive in some conditions:  product is normally benign but could become corrosive in 
the presence of other factors. 
Never corrosive: a product that is always compatible with its pipeline material. 
b. Internal Corrosion Prevention 
In order to transport a corrosive product in a pipe susceptible to corrosion, some actions may 
be taken to reduce corrosion risk. These procedures are indicated in the following 
paragraphs (Salah, 2011). 
Internal monitoring: can be conducted by an electronic probe that measures the corrosion, 
or with tabs coupon that corrode in the presence of a corrosive substance and thus give an 
indication of the probable corrosion rate. 
Inhibitor injection: certain chemical products could be injected into a pipeline to reduce the 
reaction that causes corrosion. 
Internal coating: an internal coating can be applied, including spray-on plastic, mortar or 
concrete. There is a broad assortment of internal coatings for pipelines. 
Operational measures: maintaining certain temperatures and separating impurities from the 
products are the most effective operational measures for reducing corrosion risk. 
Piging : involves a cylindrical instrument that is used to clean the inside walls of pipelines, 
removing residues (and corrosion). 
2.4.2.3 Factors Affecting Subsurface Corrosion 
a. Soil Corrosivity /Pipe Corrodibility 
If there are any imperfections in a pipeline’s external coating, the soil could be in contact 
with the pipeline. Soil works as an electrolyte, promoting the galvanic corrosion of a 
pipeline’s metal. A soil’s corrosivity is related to its resistivity, as shown in table 2.1. High 




b. Cathodic Protection 
Cathodic protection effectiveness: cathodic protection is the application of an electric 
current to a metal to offset the electromotive force of corrosion. The effectiveness of 
cathodic protection can be measured by different methods, and are described in appendix A. 
Inference potential: because corrosion is an electrochemical process, cathodic protection 
works to prevent this process, the presence of other electric interference could defeat the 
cathodic protection effect (Muhlbauer, 2004). 
c. Pipeline Age 
The age of a pipeline is a main factor of pipeline deterioration, and the main sign of aging is 
corrosion. Since corrosion is a slow process, it becomes   more severe for older pipelines ( 
Henderson, et al., 2001). Figure 2.4 shows the oil spills recorded in an onshore pipeline in 
Western Europe. The figure shows how proper inspection and maintenance could decrease 
the effect of age on failure. 
 
Table 2-1  Relation between Soil Resistivity and Corrosivity (Muhlbauer, 2004) 
Soil resistivity Soil corrosively 
1.000 ohm – cm High 
Medium 1.000-15.000 
Ohm – cm or moderately active 
corrosion indicated 
Medium 
High resistivity ( low corrosion 
potential) 15.000 ohm – cm and  no 






Figure 2-4 Age of Pipeline at Time of Spill ( Henderson, et al., 2001) 
2.4.3 Factors Contributing to Operational Failure 
Operational failure can be caused by human error or by system error (Dey, 2004). The 
following factors must be considered to assess the risk of operational failure (Muhlbauer, 
2004). 
 Operational procedures; 
 Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition SCADA communication; 
 Drug testing; 
 Safety programs; 
 Surveys, maps and records; 
 Training level of the operators; and 
 Mechanical error preventers (e.g. safety and relief valves). 
2.4.4 Factors Contributing to Mechanical Failure 
Mechanical failure could be a result of design error, of the use of inappropriate materials 
and/or due to faulty construction (Davis, et al., 2010). A list of the  factors contributing to 
faulty construction and contributing to desiegn errors is presented next.  
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2.4.4.1 Factors Related to Materials Failure and Construction Fault 
The American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) defines some regulations and 
recommendations to reduce the risk of mechanical failure. These factors can be summarised 
as follows (The Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection and Insurance Company, 2000): 
 Material selection; 
 The appropriate installation procedure; 
 Leak inspection; 
 The application of QA, QC to the installation and fabrication processes; and 
 The proper construction method. 
2.4.4.2 Factors Related to Failure Caused by Design Error 
One of the main causes of mechanical failure is design error; some important subjects that 
could lead to design error as described by (Muhlbauer, 2004) include: 
a. Safety 
The safety factor is calculated by comparing the designed load of a pipeline with the actual 
load. This load could be an external load, the internal pressure in case of gas pipeline or a 
special load. 
b. Fatigue 
Fatigue failure mainly depends on the repetition of load cycles. For pipelines, the most 
important factor that affects the fatigue is the frequency of internal pressure cycles. 
c. Surge Potential 
Surge pressure or ‘water hammer’ occurs when there is a sudden change in a fluid’s 
velocity, which could be caused by a closed valve, a tripped pump trip, or other situations 
(EMERSSON Prosess Management, 2012). The power of a surge depends on a fluid’s 
density, elasticity and velocity, as well as the stoppage speed. Surge protection devices are 
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used to reduce any mechanical failure risk caused by a surge. 
d. Integrity Verification 
The existence of an integrity system could decrease the risk of mechanical failure by 
detecting any threats or anomalies. The performance of the following actions has a direct 
effect on a pipeline’s integrity: 
 Verification dates; 
 Pressure tests; 
 In-line inspection techniques and schedule; and. 
 In-line inspection accuracy. 
2.5 Pipeline Condition Rating 
Condition rating is vital to define inspection frequency and to extend service for aging 
pipelines. An inspection interval varies from six months, for some aging pipelines, to 10 
years. These intervals are set after performing a risk-based analysis (Ali, 2011). Some 
software systems have been developed to optimally set inspection frequency, such as 
ORBIT+ developed by Det Norsik Veritas (DNV) and PIPEVIEWER developed by General 
Electric (GE). These software systems mainly depend on expert opinions (Mikhail, 2011). 
Usually, condition rating is used for assessing an aging pipeline to have a better idea about 
the possibilities for service extension. The main challenges facing oil pipeline condition 
assessment are (Ali, 2011): 
1. A significant percentage of the pipelines  are unpigable (not suitable for in-line 
inspection); and 
2. A lack of data and the absence of data management. 
2.5.1 Overview of the Condition Assessment Procedure for Petroleum Pipelines 
The pipeline condition assessment process is generally used by pipeline operators to ensure 
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that a pipeline is in safe operational condition. Condition assessment is used to identify the 
life extension capacity of aged pipelines, to prioritize inspections and/or to pinpoint when 
and where to perform necessary maintenance. The following section illustrates the processes 
of identifying the pipeline condition in order to set the inspection frequency or to keep an 
aging pipeline in service. 
2.5.2 Calculation of the Remaining Strength 
In-line Inspection (ILI) reports contain thousands of anomalies and pipeline defects. Pipeline 
operators need a safe and cost-effective solution to deal with this huge amount of data 
(General Electric, 2010). To meet this challenge, the spots that have been identified by the 
ILI as having the highest metal loss should be compared to the allowable metal loss 
identified by the codes and the design criteria. The most commonly-used methods to assess 
the remaining strength of corroded pipeline are the ASME 31.G and the DNV RP 101 
(Hopkins, 2002). After calculating the remaining strength, a new Maximum Allowable 
Operating Pressure (MAOP) should be calculated. 
Case 1: If the operating pressure is below the calculated new maximum allowable pressure 
then no maintenance is needed. The next inspection will be scheduled based on the corrosion 
growth and the risk analysis. 
Case 2: If the operating pressure is higher than the newly-calculated maximum allowable 
pressure, the operator must repair the affected areas or reduce the operating pressure 
(Mikhail, 2011). 
2.5.3 Calculation of Corrosion Growth 
Different models have been developed by researchers and organisations to predict corrosion 
growth. The ASME 31.8S gives a prediction for external corrosion growth depending on 
environmental factors such as soil resistivity, as shown in table 2-2 (Morbier, 2009). Others 
models involve several factors (e.g. type of product, existence of impurities, water content 
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…etc.). Most pipeline operators utilise in-line inspection comparison to calculate the 
corrosion rate. By analysing multiyear ILI data for pipelines, all of a pipeline’s corrosion 
activities can be identified and the corrosion rate can be accurately calculated (Hashisha, 
2011). General Electric developed the RUNCOM software to calculate the corrosion growth 
for pipelines based on multiyear ILI comparison (General Electric, 2010). 
Table 2-2 External Corrosion Growth (Morbier, 2009) 
Corrosion Rate (MILS/YEAR) Soil Resistivity (OHM-CM) 
3 More than 15,000 No Active Corrosion 
6 1,000-15,000 
12 Less than 1000 
 
2.5.4 Risk-Based Inspection and Maintenance (RBIM) 
For the past 10 years, the pipeline industry has relied on risk analysis to prioritise inspection 
and maintenance. Before then, inspection intervals were defined according to pipeline 
operators’ experience and knowledge (Mikhail, 2011). Most regulatory bodies, such as the 
ASME and the American Petroleum Institute (API) have approved risk-based inspections for 
pipelines and have outlined some guidelines for its implementation (Ali 2011). Risk analysis 
is usually done by consultants, such as DNV or GE, but some companies have their own 
research departments that perform these studies by identifying the risk by performing ILI 
then studying the failure consequences. The final step is to quantify the risk and to 
recommend inspection and maintenance plan according to the risk analysis (Salah, 2011). 
General Electric implements a post-inspection program, which involves the following steps 
(Hashisha, 2011): 
 Collecting In-Line Inspection (ILI) data; 
 Identifying the spot(s) with high metal loss; 
 Identifying corrosion growth using RUNCOM software; 
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 Defining and recommending the new  maximum allowable pressure (MAOP); 
 Identifying the factors causing defects, for example; soil type, incomplete cathodic 
protection, the coating condition, etc. as well as other factors that cause defects such 
as third-party damages or internal corrosion. 
 Identifying the risk of failure and the likely consequences of failure using the 
PIPEVIEWER software, a system based on expert experience. 
 Finally, recommending the most suitable maintenance program and the date of the 
next inspection. 
As previously mentioned, most pipeline operators depend mainly on risk-based inspection 
which is based on expert opinion to set inspection frequency and/or to identify the condition 
of pipelines; in other words, there is no robust objective model capable of assessing 
petroleum pipeline condition or of predicting the failure type that threatens a pipeline. 
2.6 Current Practices for Inspection Techniques and their Appropriate 
Use 
Due to large the number of pipeline networks and their positioning (buried, above ground, 
onshore and offshore), various operating pressures (10 bar to 220 bar) and different steel 
grades (grade B to grade X80), inspection is the most important practice to ensure pipeline 
integrity.  An inspection interval varies from six months, for some aging pipelines, to 10 
years. These intervals are set after performing a risk-based analysis (Ali, 2011).     
 A set of new technologies have been developed in the last 20 years to overcome this 
challenging issue and to provide an effective, accurate and economical solution for pipeline 
operators. An inspection gives operators a view of several parameters that could cause 
pipeline failure. The most important parameters measured by inspection are (Ali, 2011): 
 Free span (for offshore pipeline); 
 Coating condition; 
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 Cathodic protection condition; 
 Existence of dents or cracks; 
 Calculating the metal loss caused by internal or external corrosion; 
 Wall thickness measurement; and 
 Geometric measurement. 
Pipeline inspection can be categorized as external inspection and internal inspection. For 
external inspection techniques, offshore techniques are different than onshore techniques due 
to the very different types of insulation and environment. In-line inspection techniques are 
the same in onshore and offshore pipelines. 
2.6.1 Onshore Pipeline Inspection 
Since in-line inspection is expensive and time consuming, onshore pipelines are usually 
inspected externally, according the National Association of Corrosion Engineers (NACE). 
In-line inspection is performed at long intervals compared to offshore pipeline because of 
the particular challenges of carrying out external inspection of offshore pipelines. The 
External Corrosion Direct Assessment (ECDA) procedure is shown below (Mikhail, 2011):   
 Perform DCVG tests and CIPS tests to assess the coating condition and the cathodic 
protection effectiveness, respectively; 
 Perform a soil resistivity test to identify the level of corrosivity; 
 Analyze the data from the above tests in order to select the critical points to use for 
verifying it with Ultrasonic testing (UT) devices to assess the metal loss; and 
 Perform UT tests at the selected points and do suitable repairs if needed. 
2.6.2 Offshore Pipeline Inspection 
Offshore pipeline inspection is very dependent upon in-line inspection due to the physical 
difficulties involved with external inspection. The common techniques used by pipeline 
operators are MFL and UT.  Most pipeline operators prefer MFL over UT, for the following 
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reasons (Mikhail, 2011): 
 MFL can be used for pipelines that carry gas or oil, while UT requires a liquid 
environment. UT is thus not convenient (or even possible sometimes) for gas 
pipelines. 
 UT requires extensive cleaning of the pipeline inner surface. 
 An MFL tool usually runs at a speed of 4m/sec, while a UT tool runs at a speed of 
1m/sec, so the MFL process takes much less time than UT. 
 MFL is less expensive than UT (in part because of the above two aspects). 
2.7 Previous Studies on Oil and Gas Pipeline Condition Assessment 
Some significant efforts in pipeline condition assessment have been made in the last decade. 
A Fuzzy Neural Network (FNN) model was developed in 2008 to calculate the rate of failure 
for oil and gas pipelines (Yu Peng, et al., 2008).The main goal of this research was to 
calculate the rate of failure of pipelines. Since corresponding pipeline history failure data is 
difficult to collect, a fault tree fuzzy analysis method was applied and a fault tree for external 
corrosion constructed. Experts evaluated the probability of events using natural language 
and then these linguistic variables were transformed into fuzzy numbers. All the incidents 
identified by the fault tree can be fed to the neural network model which then calculates the 
probability of pipeline failure as an output. It is obvious that this study does not eliminate 
subjectivity because of its dependence on expert opinion to evaluate the probability of 
events. Moreover, the model only predicts the probability of failure caused by corrosion. 
A risk assessment model created in 2010 takes historical data from the US Department of 
Transportation (DOT) and treats it with artificial neural network techniques to predict third-
party failure (Bersani, et al., 2010).The main data factors that were considered in this study 
are: 
 Average population density per square km; 
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 Land use (forests, grassland, farmland (including crops)… etc); 
 Number and types of road crossings; 
 Number and type of river/stream crossings; and 
 Number of railway crossings. 
The neural network was trained with 128 positive results (failures) and 128 negative results 
(non-failure). Bersani et al. presented a prediction model that can calculate the probability of 
failure due to third-party causes by knowing the site boundaries. This model depends mainly 
on historical data, but it is limited to third-party failure. Historical failure data have also been 
used to develop a tool that predicts the class of each spillage, using statistical analysis 
Classification and a Regression Tree (C&RT) (Bertolini, et al., 2006) 
The Analytical Hierarchy Process AHP was used  develop a model that will help decision 
makers to select the most suitable types of inspecting or monitoring techniques for  pipeline 
segments that need to be evaluated (Dey, 2004). The AHP model was developed by 
predicting the risk factor and analyzing the effect of risk on pipelines. The result makes it 
possible to identify the appropriate inspection and maintenance programme, analyze the cost 
and benefits to justify the investments required, and finally suggests improvement in 
pipeline design, construction and operation. The methodology adopted in this study involves 
(Dey, 2001): 
 Classifying the pipeline into segments and collecting all the data about each segment; 
 Identifying the risk factors that can cause failure (corrosion, third party, acts of god, 
…etc.); 
 Constructing the AHP and then performing a pair-wise comparison between factors 
and sub-factors in order to determine the likelihood of pipeline failure  due to factors 
and sub-factors; and 
 Finally, the most-suitable inspection/repair method for each segment can be selected 
and a cost of failure calculated. 
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This model was applied in a case study for a 1500 km length pipeline located in Western 
India. The data was collected during a workshop with executives who operate various 
pipelines. About 30 executives participated. The case study divides the pipeline into five 
segments and the model was applied to determine the likelihood of risk menacing each 
segment. While this model covers all types of failure, it is mainly depending on expert 
opinion. 
Dawotola proposed a combined Analytical Hierarchy Process and fault tree analysis to 
support the design, construction and inspection of oil and gas pipeline. The model chooses 
an optimal selection strategy based on probability and failure consequences (Dawotola, et 
al., 2009).  
An earlier study developed a simulation-based probabilistic neural network model to 
estimate the probability of failure of aging pipelines vulnerable to corrosion (Sinha, et al., 
2002). That paper used the Probabilistic Neural Network technique (PNN) to calculate the 
probability of failure in oil pipelines due to corrosion, using magnetic flux MFL data.  
In conclusion, all of the models developed to date are either subjective or do not cover all of 
the oil and gas pipeline failure causes. In other words, there is no objective model available 
that can predict different pipeline failure types. 
2.8 Artificial neural network (ANN) technique 
2.8.1 Overview 
The human brain is living proof of the existence of massive neural networks. The human 
brain is capable of performing different complex actions (identifying faces, language, 
movement, etc.) because it contains a collection of 10 billion connected neurons. Artificial 
neural networks have been developed which are capable of generalizing a mathematical 
model of a biological nervous system. (Abraham, 2005). The ANN technique mimics the 
human brain’s techniques for learning and recalling patterns. An ANN technique is useful in 
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problems where a solution is not clearly identified, and where the relations among inputs and 
outputs are not adequately defined. (Barqawi, 2006). Neurons are randomly connected in 
three different layers (input layer, hidden layers and output layer) to form the artificial neural 
network. The hidden layers are connected to the input layer and the output layer; therefore 
they are not connected to the external world (black box) (Zayed, et al., 2005) 
Artificial Neural Networks are used in this research because of their ability to deal with the 
complex relationship between predictors and output. ANNs can also deal with categorical 
outputs and categorical predictors, which makes this technique suitable when the available 
data contains categorical variables.  
2.8.2 Artificial neural network application 
Artificial neural networks have been widely used in computer science fields and in image 
processing. In the past ten years, many engineering disciplines have used ANNs because of 
their ability to solve complex problem. The ANN technique is used to assess the condition of 
buried pipeline. It is widely used to assess the condition of water pipelines and sewer 
pipelines. A condition rating model for water mains has been developed using the back 
propagation neural network (Barqawi, 2006). 
For oil and gas pipeline, several ANN models have been developed. Sadr et al. developed a 
model to identify erosion defects detected by magnetic flux inspection (Sadr, et al., 2006). 
Another failure prediction model using ANN was created to predict third-party failure. This 
model uses the site boundary as the input and predicts the output, which is the probability of 
failure due to third-party interference (Bersani, et al., 2010). 
The models mentioned above are just a few of the examples of the application of neural 
networks in the field of pipeline condition assessment. Artificial neural networks are now 
used in many engineering domains (e.g. construction, foundations, transportation, planning 
and scheduling …etc) 
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2.8.3 Types of Artificial Neural Networks 
There are three types of neural networks, classified according to their learning paradigms; 
unsupervised, hybrid and supervised. In a supervised neural network the network is provided 
with a correct answer (output) for each pattern, then weights are generated to allow the 
network to produce output as close as possible to the real output. Unsupervised learning does 
not require providing an output to the network; instead, it perceives the underlying 
correlations of data patterns and organizes these patterns into categories. Hybrid NNs 
combine the supervised and unsupervised learning processes to provide part of the weights 
using supervised learning while the remaining weights are provided through unsupervised 
learning (Anil, et al., 1996). 
2.8.4 Multi-Layer Feed Forward (MLF) and Back Propagation (BPN) Learning  
The most popular neural network is the Multi-Layer Feed Forward trained with Back 
Propagation learning algorithm (Daniel, et al., 1997). Back propagation neural networks are 
one of the most common neural network structures; they are simple and effective. BPNNs 
learn by example, which makes them very effective at prediction (Barqawi, 2006). An MLF 
forward network consists of at least three layers: an input layer, a hidden layer and an output 
layer. Units are connected in feed forward fashion. Input neurons are connected to a hidden 
layer and then to output layers. In other words, each neuron is connected to all the neurons in 
the next layer. The connection between the ith and the jth neuron is the weight coefficient 
wij. The ith neuron has a threshold (activation function) of vi , as shown in figure 2-5 




Figure 2-5 Connection Between Two Neuron (Daniel, et al., 1997) 
The composition of a common MLF network is elaborated below, as shown in figure 2.6: 
Input layer: This layer receives all the information from the input pattern. 
Hidden layer: Neural networks can have more than one hidden layer, but should contain at 
least one. This layer is connected to the input layer and to the output layer by an activation 
function.  The hidden layer is formed by receiving values from the input layer and then 
computing a value to send to an output neuron. This layer is totally formed by the neural 
network. 
Output layer: this layer contains the weighted output received from the hidden neurons and 
compares it with the real output to adjust the weight. 
 
Figure 2-6 BPNN Architecture With one Hidden Layer (Barqawi, 2006) 
A BPNN training algorithm is commonly used to supervise neural networks where the 
output is provided to instruct the ANN. The network learns by taking the partial derivative 
of the error of the network with respect to each weight. If we take the negative of this 
derivative and add it to the weight, the error will decrease until it reaches the local minima. 
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This process is called back propagation because it involves taking this derivative and adding 
them both to the weight starts from the output layer back to the input layer. (Abraham, 2005) 
2.8.5 Learning and Recalling Process 
The learning process of supervised ANNs using a BPNN learning algorithm is accomplished 
by providing the network with data sets that include inputs and outputs so that it can be 
trained. The network pattern is introduced and then the output pattern is estimated using 
random weights. The generated output is compared to the actual output, and then the error 
value between the 2 outputs is backward propagated into the network to adjust the 
connections weights. This procedure is repeated until an allowable error is reached, or a 
maximum number of epochs is reached, or any other stopping condition is satisfied 
(Barqawi, 2006). Once the neural network is trained it may be recalled to predict the output 
for any input pattern using the connections weights calculated during the learning process. 
2.8.6 Neural Network Validation Process 
One of the advantages of neural network models is that they can be used with continuous 
data or with categorical data. Common error metrics can be used to validate an ANN model 
for continuous output, such as the Mean Absolute Error (MAE) or the Root of Mean Square 
Error (RMSE) (Dikmen , et al., 2005) methods, or by using the Average Validity Percentage 
(AVP) and the  Average Invalidity Percentage (AIP) (Zayed, et al., 2005). For categorical 
modeling the model is validated by introducing a new set of data to it and then calculating 
the percentage of correct predictions. 
2.9 Statistical models 
A statistical model is a probability distribution constructed to enable inferences to be drawn 
or decisions made from data (Davison, 2003). In other words, a statistical model is a 
formalization of relations between a set of independent and dependent variables. Many 
statistical models have been developed in the last few decades. The most important criterion 
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to use to choose a suitable model is the type of data subjected to modeling. The different 
types of dependant and independent variables are listed and compared below.  
2.9.1 Continuous vs. Discreet Variables 
Variables can be categorised as continuous or discreet according to the number of values 
they can take. Continuous variables are those variables that take a large number of values, 
such as Pipeline Diameter, while discreet variables take only a few values, such as course 
grade (Agresti, 2002). 
2.9.2 Nominal vs. Ordinal Variables 
Categorical variables can be ordinal or nominal. Ordinal variables have an order relationship 
between the values. as in ‘course grade A is better than course grade B’, while with nominal 
variables there is no value relation (as can be the case with colors, for example). 
2.9.3 Logistic Regression 
In our case, the dependent variables are nominal (type of failure) and all the independent 
variables are discrete except for pipeline age and diameter, which are continuous. Since the 
output (dependent variables) is nominal and discreet, we are obligated to choose a discreet 
choice model. The basic form of logistic regression is used for the binary response and the 
Multinomial Logit (MNL) model uses the same methodology to deal with multiple outputs. 
For binary categorical variables using the usual least squares deviation criteria, the best-fit 
approach of minimizing error around the line of best fit is inappropriate. Instead, logistic 
regression applies the binomial probability theory, which has only two values to predict: 
probability is 1 or 0. The logistic regression develops a best-fitting function (logistic 
function) using the maximum likelihood method, which is based on computing several 
iteration to maximize the probability of the observed data to be part of the appropriate 
category given the regression coefficient (Burns, et al 2009) 
For a binary output Y=0 or Y=1 and multiple independent variable X, logistic regression 
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does not calculate the value of X like linear regression does, but  calculates the probability of 
Y being 1. The linear regression equation of Y is (Agresti, 2002): 
                   ……………………………………………….Equation 2-1  
Where y is the dependent variable, w1 to Wn are the estimators and x1 to Xn are the 
independent variables. The logistic regression of Y is (Agresti, 2002): 
 (   )  
 
     
   …………………………………………………………….Equation 2-2 
Where e is the natural logarithm number and Z is the logit (Agresti, 2002) 
Z = (Logit) =                  ……………………………………..Equation 2-3  
From equations 2 and 3 we can conclude that the Logit is the log of odds, as shown in 
equation 2-4 (Agresti, 2002) 
        (
 (   )
   (   )
)                   ………………………...Equation 2-4  
Figure 2.7 shows a set of data classified into categories 0 and 1. The continuous line 
represents the linear regression and the solid S curve represents the logistic function for the 
logistic regression, in which the vertical value of each point on the curve represents the 
probability of the Dependant Variable (DV) being equal to 1. 
 
 




Assumption and Limitation for Logistic Regression 
According to Burns the assumptions and limitations are as follows:  
 Logistic regression does not assume a linear relationship between the dependent and 
the independent variables; 
 There must be dichotomy (2 categories) among the dependent variables; 
 The categories must be mutually exclusive; 
 Large samples are required -- larger than for linear regression; 
 The independent variables should not be intervals, nor normally or linearly 
distributed; and 
 related, nor of equal variance within each group 
2.9.4 Multinomial Logit (MNL) Model 
MNL is a straight forward extension of logistic regression. For a dependent variable (DV) 
that has M categories, one value the first, the last, or the one that has the highest frequency 
of the DV is chosen to be the reference category. The probability memberships of each of 
the other dependent variables are compared to the probability membership in the reference 
category. For a DV with M categories, M - 1 equations are required to describe the relation 
between the dependent variables and the independent variables (Williams, R, 2011). When 
there are more than two categories, the equations used to calculate the probability for the 
outcome from m=2 to M are: (Agresti, 2002) . 
 (   )  
   
(  ∑         
   ………………………………………………………Equation 2-5 
The probability for the reference category is (Agresti, 2002) 
 (   )  
 
(  ∑         
   ………………………………………………………..Equation 2-6  
Where Z is the Logit defined in equation 2.3. 
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The MNL model was used because it can deal with categorical variables. Moreover, the 
MNL model generates probability equations for each output category, which gives a clear 
view of the failure that menaces a pipeline, thereby helping pipeline operators to make 
decisions about the actions required. 
 
2.9.5 Goodness of Fit and Validation 
The Log Likelihood (LL) is the criterion for selecting parameters in logistic regression. 
However, it is always used by multiplying by -2 and is thus called -2LL. The highest 
positive value of -2LL indicates the worst prediction. In order to identify the significant 
predictor, -2LL is calculated for a model with only an intercept and compared with the -2LL 
of the full model with all predictors. The difference between the -2LL for the full model and 
the model with only intercept is the CHI SQUARE for the model. Moreover, a model is 
considered significant if the statistical significance for the full model is less than 0.05. 
Models are also validated by comparing predicted values to the actual values for new data 
sets (Menard, 2002).    
2.10 Summary 
Oil pipeline’s attributes have significant effect on the likely types of pipeline failure. This 
effect could be direct or indirect. As mentioned, all the condition assessment models and 
failure predicting models developed to date depend on expert opinions which makes them 
subjective, or they are limited to predicting only one type of failure. This research proposes a 
failure prediction model that employs five pipeline attributes to objectively predict the 
failure that threatens a pipeline, based on historical data, from among the three major causes 
of failure (mechanical, corrosion and third-party). The MNL and ANN techniques are used 






The main objective of this research is to identify the type of failure that menaces an oil 
pipeline by knowing some basic pipeline features. All of the failure modes threatening oil 
pipelines are studied as a perquisite to this identification process. Moreover, an extensive 
study of pipeline attributes and their influence on each type of failure cause is performed. 
The model’s development is based mainly on historical data presented in the CONCAWE 
report for 2010, which displays all of the accidents that transpired in the European pipeline 
system over the last 38 years. The report cites the cause of each accident, which is the 
model’s output, as well as some pipeline attributes, which are the model’s inputs. The 
methodology followed to achieve this goal consists of five main stages, as presented in 
figure 3.1: 
1. A literature review which presents the main causes of pipeline failures, the current 
practices of oil and gas pipeline inspection techniques and a review of factors those 
contribute to pipeline failure. 
2. Data collection and data preparation. 
3. Development of a failure prediction model using Artificial Neural Networks. 
4. Development of a failure prediction model using the Multi-Nomial Logit (MNL) 
technique. 








































Figure 3-1 Research Methodology  
3.2 Literature Review 
The literature review consists of 8 sections. Section 2.2 in chapter 2 shows the different 
types of pipelines, identifying the different materials and specifications used for oil and gas 
pipelines.  
Section 2.3 represents the different types of failure for oil pipelines (mechanical, operational, 
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corrosion, third party and natural). This section also clarifies the cause of each failure type 
and the percentage of occurrence of each failure cause according to historical failure data for 
the last 38 years in Europe according to CONCAWE. 
In section 2.4 we illustrate the pipeline factors and parameters that contribute to each failure 
type. Each failure’s cause(s) are identified and explained, along with the pipeline attributes 
that led to each type of failure and how it (they) contributes to that failure. 
An overview of the current condition rating procedures used by the oil industry is presented 
in section 2.5. This section also shows the usage and limitation of these condition rating 
procedures. 
A literature review for the current practices of pipeline inspection techniques is presented in 
section 2.6. This section illustrates the different types of inspection (internal and external) 
and their appropriate uses. 
Finally, a review of the recent studies and research developed for oil and gas condition 
assessment and failure prediction models is presented in section 2.7, followed by a detailed 
literature review of the Artificial Neural Network ANN techniques and an analysis of the 
Multi-Nomial Logit (MNL) model in sections 2.8 and 2.9, respectively. 
3.3 Data Collection  
The data used in this research was collected from the CONCAWE report issued in 2010, 
which lists all of the spillage accidents that occurred in the European oil pipeline system in 
the last 38 years. The report lists 467 accidents showing the cause of spillage and some 
pipeline attributes of the damaged pipeline. These lists of accidents were used to develop a 
model that is capable of predicting the cause of failure that could menace a pipeline given 
certain pipeline attributes, based on historical data. Table 3.1 represents the five factors 




Table 3-1 Description of the Factors Used in the Failure Predicting Models 
No Factor Description of Factor 
1 Pipeline Age The age of pipeline (Year) 
2 Pipeline Diameter The diameter of the pipeline (Inch) 
3 Pipeline Location The position of pipeline, either buried or above ground 
4 Land Use 
The area where the pipeline is located (residential, 
industrial,… etc.) 
5 Service The type of product transported (Crude oil, Product,… etc.) 
 
3.4 Data Processing 
In this section, the data collected from the CONCAWE report were refined to exclude any 
accidents with missing data. Moreover, all accidents caused by operational failure and 
natural hazards were excluded due to the impossibility of their prediction using the given 
pipeline parameters provided in the report. The remaining data, which consists of 289 
accidents caused by mechanical, corrosion or third-party factors (Data set 1), are used to 
develop a model that predicts the three stated failure causes, which represents 88% of the 
total accidents. In addition, the previous list of accidents (Data set 1) was further refined by 
excluding accidents caused by mechanical failure to form Data Set 2, comprised of  that 225 
accidents, in order to develop another model that predicts failure caused by corrosion and by 
third-party interference, which represents 63% of the total accidents. This step is done to 
achieve higher accuracy by decreasing the number of output to reduce the complexity of 
prediction. 
For validation purposes, 20% of accidents are randomly extracted from Data Set 1 and called 
Data Set 1 (Test) while the remaining 80% are enclosed in Data Set 1 (Training) which is 
used for model training. The same procedure is applied on Data Set 2 to form Data Set2 
(Test) that contains 20% of the total accidents with the remaining 80% comprising Data Set 
2 (Training).  
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Table 3-2 Data Sets Used for Modeling 
Name Number of Accidents Types of Failures 
Data Set 1 289 Accidents 
Mechanical, Corrosion and 
Third-Party 
Data Set 2 225 Accidents Corrosion and Third-Party 
 
3.5 ANN Failure Prediction Models 
A supervised neural network developed with the Back Propagation algorithm is used to 
develop two failure prediction models for oil pipelines. The ANN technique was used 
because of its capability to analyze complex relationships between predictors and output and 
its ability to treat categorical variables. The models development procedure is represented in 
figure 3.2, which represents the two main phases. The training phase employs the Data Set 
(Training) that includes 80% of the total accidents to train the ANN models. If the model 
shows satisfactory results, we go through the test phase where the developed model is 
applied to the Data Set (Test) to compare the predicted outputs with the real outputs. Based 
on this comparison, the accuracy of the model will be calculated and the model will be 
accepted if its outcomes achieve a satisfactory percentage. 
3.5.1 ANN Model 1-A (3 failure causes) 
This model is designed to predict oil pipeline failure caused by mechanical, corrosion or 
third-party failure, employing the following five pipelines attributes as input: 
1. Pipeline Diameter (in inches); 
2. Pipeline age (year) which reflect the deterioration state of the pipeline; 
3. Pipeline position, which indicate the position of pipeline as either buried or 
above-ground; 
4. Land use, which describes the  land usage where the pipeline failure occurred; 
industrial, agricultural or residential; and 
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5. Type of transported product, which could be crude oil, hot product or white 
product. 
In the refined accident list, which contains 289 accidents (Data Set 1), each accident 
contains the pre-mentioned pipeline factors and the failure type that caused the failure. A 
spreadsheet containing 80% of these accidents was introduced to the SPSS platform to train 
the ANN model using the back propagation learning algorithm, and then the preliminary 
result was verified. The next phase is to test the model using the randomly excluded 20% of 
the data by providing the developed model with the inputs only and then comparing the 
output predicted by the model with the actual output. Moreover, a mathematical validation is 
performed on the developed model, such as the Average Validity Percentage.  
This model is able to predict the failure cause that could menace the pipeline given the 
above-mentioned five pipelines attributes. The failure causes considered in this model 
represent 88% of the oil pipeline accidents according to CONCAWE (Davis, et al., 2010). 
By using this model pipeline operators will be able to identify the risk threating the pipeline 
among corrosion, mechanical failure or third-party interference. Identifying this risk will 
allow pipelines operators to take suitable actions to prevent it. 
3.5.2 ANN Model 1-B (2 Failure Causes) 
Another model was developed to predict failures caused by corrosion and by third parties in 
order to achieve prediction accuracy higher than was possible with the previous model by 
decreasing the number of output that could add some complexity. A new data set was 
prepared by excluding all the accidents caused by mechanical failure; the new data set 
contains 225 accidents (Data Set 2). The data set was treated in the same fashion as the 
previous model by excluding twenty percent of the accidents for validation purposes and 
using the remaining eighty percent for training the artificial neural network. The failure 
causes considered in this model, corrosion failure and third-party failure are responsible for 
63% of all oil pipeline accidents according to CONCAWE. 
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3.6 MNL Failure Prediction Model 
The Multi-Nomial Logit (MNL) technique is usually used to analyse nominal (categorical) 
data with nominal output, which would be challenging to analyse using ordinary linear 
regression. The advantage of using MNL over using ANN is that the MNL gives failure 
prediction equations as an output. This equation can then be used to predict the failure mode 
that threats the pipeline. The model development procedure is represented in figure 3.3. The 
figure shows that Data Set (Training) that contains 80% of the total accidents data will be 
introduced to the SPSS software to be modeled using the MNL technique. If the analysis 
results are satisfactory we proceed to the testing phase where the generated equations will be 
applied to the Data Set (Test) which contains the randomly excluded 20% of accidents. Then 
the predicted outputs will be compared with the actual outputs and the accuracy percentage 
is calculated accordingly. The model will be accepted if the percentage of correct predictions 
is satisfactory. 
3.7  MNL Model 2 (3 Failure Causes) 
This model is also designed to predict the type of failure threating a pipeline, corrosion, 
mechanical or third-party failure, using the same five pipeline attributes mentioned in the 
previous models. The model uses Data Set 1 which consists of 289 accidents, the same as for 
Model 1-A. The model development procedure has two main phases; the modeling phase 
and the testing phase. In the modeling phase 80% of the data was introduced to the SPSS 
software in a spreadsheet.  Next, the inputs and the outputs were defined to the software. The 
model then produces equations that calculate the probability of occurrence of each failure 
type and some basic diagnostics such as the Chi square and the Pseudo R square. The next 
phase is to validate the model by applying the generated equations to the randomly excluded 
data which contains 20% of the total number of accidents. This is to compare the actual 
output with the predicted output and produce useful statistics such as the average validity 
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percentage and the percentage of right prediction. The model is accepted if it shows 
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Figure 3-3 MNL Models Development 
3.8 Validation and Sensitivity Analysis 
The goal of validation is to check the developed model’s effectiveness. This is done by 
applying the developed models to the validation data set to compare the predicted versus 
actual values, and then calculate the percentage of correct predictions, the average validity 
percentage and the average invalidity percentage. In addition, a sensitivity analysis was 
performed for each predictor to recognise the influence of variations in the input on the 
model’s outputs. This is done by changing each predictor under study between its maximum 





The methodology of the current research includes an extensive literature review, data 
collection and data preparation, development of oil pipeline failure prediction models using 
ANN and MNL techniques. Moreover, it details the procedure followed in this research to 
develop failure predicting models for oil pipelines by demonstrating each step, from data 




















4 DATA COLLECTION 
4.1 Introduction 
The data used in this research are collected from the report published on 2010 by 
CONCAWE, an association of European oil companies established to address 
environmental, health and safety issues related to refining and distribution. The CONCAWE 
was founded in 1963 by a small group of oil companies to carry out research on 
environmental issues related to the oil industry. Most of the oil companies operating in 
Europe are now members of CONCAWE. Its research efforts cover a range of 
environmental field such as fuel emissions, soil contamination and cross-county pipeline 
performance (CONCAWE, 2010). 
The report prepared by the CONCAWE Oil Pipelines Management Group (OPMG) in 2010 
recorded 38 years of spillage data for 35000 km of oil pipelines that transport 780 million m
3 
of crude oil and petroleum products across Europe. The spillage causes are grouped into five 
main categories: mechanical failure, operational failure, corrosion, natural hazards and third-
party failure. The report indicates all the accidents that occurred since 1971, showing their 
failure cause and some of the respective pipeline attributes (Davis, et al., 2010). 
4.2 Data Organization  
The collected data, which consists of 467 spillage accidents in cross-country oil pipeline, is 
composed of a set of oil pipeline characteristics, the cause of failure and the spillage 
consequences, as shown in figure 4.1. The following represent the pipeline criteria for 
inclusion in the accident inventory (Davis, et al., 2010) 
 Pipelines that transport crude oil or petroleum product. 
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 Minimum length of 2 kilometers in the public domain. 
 Running cross country, including short estuary or river crossings but excluding lines 
serving offshore production facilities and offshore tanker loading/discharge 
facilities. 
  Including pump stations and intermediate storage facilities but excluding origin and 
destination terminal facilities and tank farms. 
 Minimum spillage size of 1 m3, unless there are exceptional safety or environmental 
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Figure 4-1 Sample of the List of Accidents as Stated in the CONCAWE Report 2010 (Davis, 
et al., 2010) 
4.3 Model Inputs 
4.3.1 Pipeline age 
Pipeline age is one of the main factors that have a direct influence on corrosion failure, as 
mentioned in the literature review. Since corrosion is a slow process, an aging pipeline is 
usually more vulnerable to corrosion failure ( Henderson, et al., 2001). It also reflects the 
deterioration state of a pipeline. The age of pipelines cited in this study varies from one year 
old to 40 years old. 
4.3.2 Pipeline diameter 
Pipeline diameter is one of the physical factors that has a direct influence on third-party 
failure, as elaborated in chapter 2. Pipelines with a relatively small diameter are more 
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vulnerable to third-party damage caused by activities such as excavation. Moreover, smaller 
pipelines can be mechanically damaged during construction (Ali, 2011). The pipeline 
diameter is measured by inch and varies from 1 inch to 60 inch.  
4.3.3 Service 
This factor shows the type of product transported in pipelines, as it has a direct influence on 
corrosion failure. The types of product considered are shown in table 4.1. Since service types 
4 and 5 contributed to only 8 accidents there were excluded to simplify the analysis. Table 
4.2 shows the service types considered in this research. The crude oil represents the crude 
product extracted from a well without any refining process. White products include 
Naphthas, gasoline, gas oils (diesel) and Kerosenes. Finally fuel/hot oil is considered heavy 
fuel oils and lubricating oils and in some cases very heavy crude oils are part of this type. 
The product is heated before entering the system, to assure it has adequate flow 
characteristics (Haan, 2012). 
Table 4-1 types of product (Davis, et al., 2010) 
Service Type of Product 
1 Crude Oil 
2 White Product 
3 Fuel Oil (HOT) 
4 Crude Oil or Product 
5 Lubes Hot 
 
Table 4-2 Types of Transported Product Considered in this research 
Service Code Type of Product 
1 Crude Oil 
2 White Product 
3 Fuel Oil (HOT) 
4.3.4 Facility 
This factor describes the location of a pipeline. In this research we considered only 
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underground and above-ground pipeline as shown in table 4.3. All the pump station 
accidents (31) were excluded. This factor has a great influence on both corrosion failure and 
third-party failure, as described in detail in chapter 2. 
Table 4-3 Location of Pipeline Considered in this Research 
Facility Location of Pipeline 
1 Underground Pipe 
2 Above-round Pipe 
4.3.5 Land Use 
This factor describes where the failure occurred. To simplify the analysis we merged the 
land uses of residential high-density and residential low-density into one factor, named as 
residential. Moreover, we excluded all those accidents that occurred in forested hills, the 
Barren Lands, and in water bodies because of their small numbers (only 7 accidents). Table 
4.4 shows the types of land use reported in the CONCAWE report while table 4.5 shows the 
types of land use considered in this research. 
Table 4-4 land use reported in the CONCAWE Report (Davis, et al., 2010) 
Land Use Location of Pipeline 
1 Residential High Density 
2 Residential Low Density 
3 Agricultural 
4 Industrial or Commercial 
5 Forested hills 
6 Barren Lands 
7 Water Body 
 
Table 4-5 Land Use considered in this Research 
Land Use Location of Pipeline 
1 Residential 
2 Agricultural 




4.4 Model Outputs 
This section describes the failure causes reported in the CONCAWE report and their sub-
factors as shown in table 4.6. Also the percentage of accidents related to each failure cause is 
represented in figure 4.2. 
1- Mechanical Failure (Considered): Includes failure resulting from either a design or 
material fault (e.g. metallurgical defect, inappropriate material specification) or construction 
fault (e.g. defective weld, inadequate support,…etc.). This also includes the failure of 
sealing devices. 
2- Operational Failure (Not Considered): This means a failure resulted from operational 
upsets, malfunction or inadequacy of safeguarding systems (e.g. instrumentations, 
mechanical pressure relief system) or from operator error. 
3- Corrosion Failure (Considered): Failure as a result of external and/or internal corrosion 
or stress crack corrosion.  
4- Natural Hazard (Not Considered):  Includes failure resulting from a natural occurrence 
such as land movement, flooding …etc. 
5- Third-Party Failure (Considered): Includes all failure resulting from third-party 
actions, accidental or intentional. Also includes incidental third-party damage that was 
undetected and resulted in a failure at some later time. 
Table 4-6   Accident Failure Causes (Davis, et al., 2010) 
Failure Cause A B C 
A. Mechanical Failure Design & Material Construction  
B. Operational System Human  
C. Corrosion External Internal Stress Corrosion 
D. Natural Hazard Ground Movement Other  







Figure 4-2 Percentage of Accidents Related to Failure Types 
4.5 Data preparation  
The data gathered consists of 467 accidents caused by five failure causes. Since the report 
only provides five pipeline characteristics, as discussed earlier, it is challenging to develop a 
model that can predict the five failure causes only from these five parameters. According to 
the literature, these five parameters are only related to mechanical failure, corrosion failure 
and third-party failure. There is no significant relation between these parameters and the 
other failure causes (operational and natural). Based on this assessment, two models were 
developed. 
 Model A: predicts failure caused by mechanical failure, corrosion failure and third-party 
failure.  
Model B: predicts failure caused by only corrosion and third-party failure. 
4.5.1 Data Set 1  
The first step of the data preparation is to exclude the accidents with missing data; next all of 
the accidents caused by operational failure and natural failure are also excluded. Moreover, 















were left with 289 accidents due to mechanical, third-party or corrosion failures. This set of 
accident data were organized into EXCEL spreadsheets with six columns. The first five 
columns represent the pipeline attributes, some of which are continuous variables and some 
are nominal variables, as shown in table 4.7. The last column represents the output, which is 
the failure cause as shown in table 4.8. For validation purposes twenty percent of Data Set 1 
were randomly excluded and named as Data Set 1 (Test). The remaining 80 % were used for 
the model training and called Data Set 1 (Training).Figure 4.3 represent a sample of the 
Spread sheet for Data Set 1. 
Table 4-7 Models predictors 
Predictor Unit Form 
Pipeline age Year Continuous 
Pipeline diameter Inch Continuous 
Land use Category Nominal 
Facility Category Nominal 
Service Category Nominal 
 
Table 4-8 Models output 
Failure Cause (output) Code 
Mechanical Failure 1 
Corrosion Failure 2 
Third Party Failure 3 
4.5.2 Data Set 2 
Data set 2 was prepared for the failure prediction model to predict only corrosion failure and 
third-party failure. Therefore, all the accidents caused by mechanical failure were removed 
from Data set 1.  Data set 2 contains 225 accidents caused by either corrosion failure or 
third-party failure. As with Data Set 1, twenty percent of Data Set 2’s items were randomly 
excluded for validation and named as Data Set 2 (Test). The remaining 80% were used for 
training and called Data Set 2 (Training). 
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Dia/inch Service Facility  Age/year 
Land 
use Output 
22 1 1 18 1 2 
9 1 1 46 1 2 
16 1 1 23 1 3 
12 2 1 30 1 1 
 
Figure 4-3 Sample of Spread Sheet for Data Set 1 
4.6 Summary  
This chapter presented the data collection and preparation of two sets of data required to 
develop two failure prediction models. It also identifies and explains the inputs reported on 
the original data and the inputs considered in these models showing the reason behind this 
selection. More over the original data outputs were illustrated in this chapter and the outputs 















5 ARTIFICIAL NEURAL NETWORKS’ APPLICATION TO 
FAILURE PREDICTION MODELING 
5.1 Introduction  
In the real world, historical data is usually very noisy. It is challenging to create a robust 
prediction model using historical data. One of the main advantages of using Artificial Neural 
Networks is their ability to deal with historical data because they mimic the human brain in 
its capacity to predict patterns based on learning and recalling processes. In other words, the 
ANN technique is applicable when the causal relationships among predictors are unknown 
(Sadik, et al., 2004). 
This section presents the development of two failure prediction models for oil pipelines 
using the artificial neural network technique. These two models consider as inputs five 
pipelines attributes: diameter, age, pipeline positioning, the area where the failure occurred, 
and the type of product transported. The first model predicts the type of failure from among 
three failure types, mechanical, corrosion and third-party, as those three types of failure are 
the main cause of 88% of all oil pipeline spillage according to the CONCAWE. The second 
model is developed in order to achieve a high accuracy of prediction, but it only predicts 
failure caused by corrosion or third-party interference, which together represent 63% of 
pipeline failures according to the CONCAWE. 
5.2 Factors Included in the ANN Models  
Various physical, environmental and operational factors contribute to pipeline failure, as 
discussed in chapter 2. The factors considered in this research are selected based on the 
availability of historical data provided in the CONCAWE report, as shown in table 5.1. 
However, some of the other factors presented in chapter 2 could be considered in future 
53 
 
studies. The physical factors include pipeline diameter and pipeline age, and are considered 
as continuous variables. The facility and land use are considered environmental factors and 
both are nominal variables. Finally, the only operational factor considered in this research is 
that of service type, which is also considered as nominal. The description of these factors 
and their effect on pipeline failure was presented in detail in chapter 2. 
Table 5-1 Factors Included in the Failure Prediction Model 
Factor Type Variable Categories Scale 
Physical 
Factors 
Pipeline Diameter Continuous Inch 


























5.3 Model 1-A: Pipeline Failure Prediction Model for Three Failure 
Types 
This model is designed to objectively predict the type of failure that could menace a pipeline 
among mechanical failure, corrosion failure and third-party failure based on historical data. 
Five factors are selected as the model’s inputs based on the availability of the historical data, 
as represented in table 5.1. Since three of these factors are nominal, each category of 
nominal factors is represented by one neuron at the input layer; for the other two continuous 
factors, each is represented by one neuron.  The input layer thus consists of 10 neurons. The 
output layer consists of 3 neurons, each neuron representing a type of failure (mechanical, 
corrosion and third party). The SPSS 19 software is used for the ANN model development 
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because of its following qualities: 
1. Ease of use; 
2. Short training time; 
3. Its flexibility in  modifying the training parameters; and 
4. Its ability to deal with nominal variables and output.  
Data Set 1, which includes 289 accidents, was used for this model. Data Set 1 (Training), 
containing 80% of the Data Set 1 accidents,  was fed to the SPSS software via Excel and 
used to train the model, while the remaining twenty percent were used to test the model. 
The network architecture consists of one input layer with 10 neurons, one hidden layer 
containing 35 neurons and an output layer that contains 3 neurons.  The gradient decent was 
used as an optimization algorithm. The training process uses the Back Propagation 
algorithm.  The learning rate is 0.05 and the momentum is 0.9. The Tanh activation function 
was used between the input layer and the hidden layer. The stopping rule is 10 steps without 
any error decrease. Figure 5.1 shows the network information, while figure 5.2 represents 
the model summary. 
Twenty percent of the accidents in Data Set 1 (Training) were used by the SPSS software to 
test the model accuracy of prediction for predicting each output of the three outputs. The 
percentage of correct prediction for the test sample shows that 73.8% of the data are 
correctly classified. The SPSS package also displays the Receiver Operating Characteristic 
(ROC) curve for each output. Each curve treats the category at issue as the positive state 
versus the aggregate of all other categories. Basically, the Y axis is the (sensitivity), which is 
the true positive rate, and the X axis is the (1-specificity (true negative rate)), or the false 
positive rate. The area under the ROC curve measures the prediction accuracy  (1 is the best 
and 0.5 is the worst. .Figure 5.3 represents the ROC curve for the Dependent Output, while 
table 5.2 represent the area under the ROC curve for each output (Hanley, et al., 1982). The 
results show that the area under the ROC curve for each output is generally more than 0.75, 
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which indicates good prediction accuracy. For further details, please see (Fawccet, 2004).  
 
 
Figure 5-1 Network Information Model 1-A 
 
 






Figure 5-3 ROC Curve for 3 Outputs for Model 1-A 
 
Table 5-2 Area under the ROC Curves Model 1-a 
Output Area 
1 Mechanical Failure 0.746 
2 Corrosion Failure 0.792 
3 Third-Party Failure 0.776 
5.3.1 Factors’ Importance 
The SPSS software can determine the importance of each predictor contributing in the neural 
network. Table 5.3 represents the importance of each predictor, while figure 5.4 displays a 
chart of the normalized importance of each predictor. It is clear that the most important 
factor is the type of service (type of transported oil), while the least important predictor is 




Table 5-3 Predictor Importance 
Model Inputs Importance Normalized Importance 
Service 0.270 100% 
Facility 0.193 71.7% 
Land use 0.142 52.8% 
Diameter 0.263 97.4% 
Age 0.132 48.9% 
 
 
Figure 5-4 Normalized Importance Chart 
5.3.2 Model Validation 
As mentioned above, twenty percent of Data Set 1’s accidents were kept aside for validation 
and called Data Set 1 (Test). Since the data is nominal, the main validating test is to 
determine the percentage of correct predictions for the developed model. In order to identify 
this percentage the ANN model is recalled and applied to the records in Data Set 1 (Test) 
without introducing the failure cause to the software. The output obtained by the developed 
model is compared to the actual cause of failure, and the percentage of correct predictions is 
calculated. It was found that the prediction percentage was 68.5%, which is fairly good. A 
plot was prepared (figure 5.5) to display the failure cause predicted by the developed model 
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versus the actual failure cause for the validation data set (here consisting of 57 accidents). 
In accordance with Zayed and Halpin’s (2005), the Average Validity Percentage (AVP), 
which shows the validity percentage out of 100 and the Average Invalidity Percentage 
(AIP), which shows the prediction errors, were applied to validate the ANN model using the 
following equations. 
    (∑     (
  
  
)  )         …………………………………………………Equation 5-1  
           ………………………………………………………………..Equation 5-2  
Where: 
AIP = Average Invalidity Percentage; 
AVP = Average Validity Percentage; 
Ei = Predicted Value; and 
Ci = Actual Value. 














5.3.3 Sensitivity Analysis  
A sensitivity analysis is carried out on the developed model in order to identify the effect of 
the variation of predictor values on the failure type. An accident was randomly chosen 
(where the diameter was 11, service was type 2, facility was type 1, age was 40 and the land 
use was type 1), and then each predictor under study was changed between its maximum 
value and its minimum value while keeping the other predictors constant. The procedure was 
repeated for each input. In those cases where there was no change in output related to a 
particular input we maintained other inputs at a different value, one at time, to study the co-
relation between inputs. The sensitivity analysis almost completely confirms the inputs’ 
importance that was previously determined by the SPSS software in the predictor 
importance table, which shows that ‘service’ is the most sensitive predictor while ‘age’ has 
the smallest affect. The following subsection shows the sensitivity analysis chart for each 
predictor. 
a. Effect of Service Variation 
The following chart shows the effect of changing the type of transported oil on the failure 
cause. Figure 5.6 also shows that for this particular case, when the type of oil is white 
products, the failure that occurs is due to a  third-party cause, while when the transported 
product was crude oil or hot products the failure cause changes to corrosion  because of the 
impurities and heat of these types of product that induce corrosion. 
 


















b. Effect of Facility Variation 
The change in failure cause due to pipeline location is presented in figure 5.7. With buried 
pipeline, the predicted failure cause was third-party failure, while with above-ground 
pipeline the failure causes become mechanical-based.  
 
Figure 5-7 Failure Cause versus Facility  
 
c. Effect of Land Use Variation  
We found that there is no variation in the type of failure due to the change of the land use for 
the chosen accident. We then changed the other inputs once at a time to identify any co-
relation between the inputs, as presented in figure 5.8. The figure indicates a significant 
correlation between land use and age, diameter and service. 
 






























Failure Cause Vs Land Use
Failure Cause vs Land Use at
Age 10
Failure Cause Vs Land use at
Diameter 30"




d. Effect of Diameter Variation 
Figure 5.9 represents the failure cause change due to diameter variation. It shows that 
pipelines with small diameters are vulnerable to third-party failure, as mentioned previously 
in the literature, while the failure cause changes when pipe diameter is larger. 
 
Figure 5-9 Failure Cause versus Diameter 
e. Effect of Age Variation 
As mentioned earlier, pipeline age has the lowest importance weight. Figure 5.10 shows that 
there is no effect from age variation on the type of failure, but when the diameter is changed 
to a larger diameter of 30 inches the effect of age became stronger, as indicated in figure 
5.11. 
 
Figure 5-10 Failure Cause versus Age 
 












































Failure Cause Variartion vs
Age at Diameter 30 inch
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5.4 Model 1-B: Failure Prediction Model for Oil Pipeline for Two Failure 
Types 
As mentioned previously, this model is able to predict oil pipeline failure caused by 
corrosion failure and by third-party failure, which together cause 63% of oil pipeline failure 
according to CONCAWE. The model uses Data set 2, which contains 225 accidents caused 
only by corrosion or third-party failure. This model follow the same procedure presented 
earlier, by using Data Set 2 (training) which contains 80% of the total accidents for training, 
while Data Set 2 (Test) containing the remaining 20%, are used for validation. 
The network architecture is comprised of one input layer with 10 neurons, one hidden layer 
containing 26 neurons, and the output layer with 2 neurons.  The gradient decent was used as 
an optimization algorithm. The training uses the Back Propagation algorithm.  The learning 
rate is 0.05 and the momentum is 0.9. The Tanh activation function was used between the 
input layer and the hidden layer. The stopping rule is 20 steps with no error decrease. Figure 
5.12  shows the network information, and figure 5.13 represents the model summary. The 
percentage of correct predictions shows that 73.3% of the data were classified correctly. The 
Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve for each output is represented in Figure 5.14 
while the area under the ROC curve measures the accuracy of prediction and is represented 
in table 5.4. The calculated area is close to 0.85, which is better than the three-output model. 
 




Figure 5-13 Model 1-B summary 
 
Figure 5-14 ROC Curve for 2 Outputs for Model 1-B 
 
Table 5-4 Area under the ROC Curve for Model 1-B 
Output Area Under The R.O.C Curve 
1.Corrosion Failure 0.842 
2.Third Party Failure 0.842 
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5.4.1 Factors’ Importance  
As represented in the previous model, the SPSS software has the ability to determine the 
importance of each predictor contributing in the neural network. Table 5.5 represents the 
importance of each predictor while figure 5.15 displays a chart of the normalized importance 
of each predictor. It can be seen that the most important factor is the service (type of 
transported oil), while the least important predictor is the facility. 
Table 5-5 Factors Importance for Model 1-B 
Predictor Importance Normalized Importance 
Service 0.418 100% 
Land Use 0.166 39.8% 
Facility 0.93 22.2% 
Age 0.174 41.8% 
Diameter 0.149 35.7% 
 
 




5.4.2 Model 1-B Validation 
As described previously, twenty percent of Data Set 2 were kept aside for validation and 
called Data Set 2 (Test). We found the percentage of correct prediction to be 72.2%, which 
is better than with the previous model. A graphic Figure 5.16 displays the failure causes 
predicted by the developed model versus the actual failure cause for the validation data set, 
consisting of 43 accidents. The model produces an AVP of 72.8% and an AIP of 27.2%. 
 
Figure 5-16 Actual versus Predicted Failure types, Model 1-B 
5.4.3 Sensitivity Analysis for Model 1-B 
A sensitivity analysis was carried out for the developed model to identify the effect of 
varying predictor values on the failure type. The sensitivity analysis follows the same 
procedure as in the previous model.  
a. Effect of service variation 
The following chart (figure 5.17) presents the effect of service variation on the type of 
failure. The chart also shows that for this particular case, when the type of oil was white 
products the failure occurs due to third-party causes, while when the transported product was 
crude oil or hot products the failure cause changes to corrosion because of the impurities and 










Figure 5-17 Failure Cause versus Service Variation 
b. Effect of Facility Variation 
The following figure 5.18 shows that the facility variation does not affect the failure cause in 
the case of the randomly-chosen accident, but that facility does become a factor when the 







Figure 5-18 Failure Cause versus Facility Variation for Model 1-B 
c. Effect of Land Use Variation 
The land use did not have an effect in this particular accident, but it shows some significant 
effect when the diameter is 30 inches and when the type of transported oil changes from 
white product to crude oil. The land use variation effect is presented in figure 5.19. 
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Failure Cause vs Facility at
Diameter 30
Failure Cause Vs Facility
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d. Effect of Diameter Variation 
The following figure 5.20 represents the effect of diameter variation on the failure type. It 
shows that small diameter pipelines are more vulnerable to third-party failure, which has 
been noted in the literature and summarized in chapter 2. 
 
Figure 5-20 Failure Cause versus Diameter Variation for Model 1-B 
 
e. Effect of Age Variation 
The study of age variation shows that there is no effect of age variation on the failure type 
for the accident selected, as presented in figure 5.21. However, when the diameter is 
changed from 9 to 30 inches, pipeline age starts to have an effect on the failure type, as 
shown in figure 5.22. 
 
































Figure 5-22 Failure Cause versus Age Variation at a 30-inch Diameter for Model 1-B 
5.5 Summary  
Two ANN models were developed to predict the type of failure that would most likely 
menace an oil pipeline, with five pipeline parameters known: diameter, age, type of 
transported product, land usage and position. The first model is designed to predict failure 
caused by mechanical failure, corrosion failure or third-party failure. The model validation 
showed that it has the ability to identify the failure cause with an accuracy percentage of 
68.5%.The second model is designed to predict the failure caused by corrosion failure or by 
third-party failure and has the ability to identify the failure cause with an accuracy 



















6 MULTINOMIAL LOGIT MODEL APPLICATION TO OIL 
PIPELINE FAILURE PREDICTION MODEL 
6.1 Introduction  
Logistic regression is a prediction approach, similar to an ordinary least square regression 
(OLS). The multinomial logit model is used when categories are unordered or nominal data 
exists (Burns, et al 2009). In our case, three of our predictors and the output are nominal 
unordered categories. In this section we show the development of our failure prediction 
model using the multinomial logit technique. This model is designed to predict the failure 
type among Mechanical failure, corrosion failure and third-party failure. The developed 
model is validated and a sensitivity analysis performed for each predictor. 
6.2 Model 2: Failure Prediction Model for Oil Pipeline for Three Outputs  
This model uses the same data set as model 1-A (see section 5.3). SPSS software is also used 
to develop the MNL model because of its ease of use and its detailed results. Data Set 1 
(training), was introduced via an EXCEL spreadsheet to the SPSS software to perform the 
MNL analysis, while Data Set 2 (Test) was kept aside for validation. As mentioned in 
chapter five, the model has two continuous inputs (age and diameter), three nominal inputs 
(service, facility and land use) and three nominal outputs representing the failure cause 
(mechanical, corrosion, and third-party). 
The multinomial regression performs the analysis by computing the probability of 
occurrence of each failure type, where the highest probability is set as a predicted value. The 
logit model pairs each category to a base line category, in our case the last output category 
(third-party failure) is the baseline category. For more details, please refer to Agresti 2002. 
Since the Ordinary Least Square Method (OLS) is inapplicable for the MNL model because 
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MNL models compute the probability of occurrence for the dependent variable and not its 
value, the Maximum Likelihood Estimate (MLE) method is used to measure the MNL 
model’s performance. The MLE is the value of the parameter that makes the observed data 
most likely. Since the value of the likelihood is very small it is usually reported as the log 
likelihood or the initial log likelihood function that is equal to -2 Log Likelihood (-2LL) 
(Williams, 2011). The initial likelihood function (-2 Log Likelihood) is a statistical measure 
similar to the total sum square in linear regression. Table 6.1 shows the initial likelihood 
function value (498.091) for the model with no independent variable (constant only) and the 
initial likelihood value (387.59) for the model with all the variables independent in its first 
column of values. The decrease of the value indicates the improvement in the model’s 
prediction because of the addition of independent variables. The difference between the two 
values is the Chi Squared (101.49) and has a significant that is less than 0.0001. Based on 
the results it can be concluded that there is a significant relationship between the 
independent variables and the dependent variable (Menard, 2002). 
Table 6-1 Model Fitting Information 
Model -2 Log Likelihood Chi-Square Sig. 
Intercept Only 489.091 N/A N/A 
Final 387.592 101.499 0.000 
 
Since an ordinary R square does not exist in logistic regression, several pseudo R squares 
have been developed in order to evaluate the logistic models’ goodness of fit. These pseudo 
R-squares have a scale similar to that of R-squares that varies from 0 to 1 with a higher 
value indicating a better model fit. The pseudo R squares calculations are shown in 
equations 6.1 to 6.3 (Menard, 2002). While table 5.2 represent the pseudo R Square value 




a. Cox and Snell Pseudo R-Square 
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    …………………………………………………..Equation 6-1  
Where: 
 Mfull = the model with a predictor 
 Mintercept=  the model with all predictors, 
 L= the estimated likelihood 
N= the number of observation.  
Note: Cox and Snell R-squared cannot reach 1. 
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        ……………………………………………………..Equation 6-2  
This is an adjustment for Cox and Snell R-Square to reach the 1. 
c. McFadden Pseudo R-Square 
𝑹    
   (     )
    (          )
   ………………………………………………………Equation 6-3  
Table 6-2 Three Pseudo R-Square Values 
Pseudo R-Square Values 




In order to identify the importance of each predictor the SPSS software calculates the initial 
likelihood value for the reduced model. The reduced model is formed by omitting one effect 
from the final model, in other words, it is the likelihood of the model that includes all 
predictors except the predictor under study. This likelihood is compared with the likelihood 
achieved by the model when all predictors are included (full model). The Chi Square is then 
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calculated for each model by subtracting the full model value from the reduced model value. 
The predictor with a high Chi Square and a low significant is considered to be an important 
variable. The results generated by the SPSS process are presented in table 6.3, indicating that 
the type of service is the most important variable while pipeline age is the lowest. 
Table 6-3 Likelihood Ratio Test for Model 2 
Effect 
-2 LL of Reduced 
Model 
Chi Square Significance 
Intercept 387.592 0 . 
Diameter 399.623 12.031 0.02 
Age 389.872 2.279 0.320 
Service 436.608 49.016 0.000 
Facility 404.405 16.813 0.000 
Land Use 398.546 10.954 0.027 
 
6.2.1 Model Equation 
As discussed earlier, the concept driving the logistic regression is to calculate the probability 
of occurrence of each failure type. In order to calculate the probability of each dependant 
variable we must first calculate the Logit of each dependant variable. The Logit is similar to 
the linear regression equation, as shown in the following equation (Menard, 2002). 
                                  ………………………………………Equation 6-4 
Where; B are the variable coefficients (see table 6.4) and X are the predictor values. The 
SPSS program generates the coefficient for outputs one and two, but output three (the 
reference category) could be calculated by subtracting the probability of output one and the 






Table 6-4 Variable Coefficients 
Variables Coefficients (Output1) Coefficients (Output2) 
Intercept 2.005 3.949 
Diameter 0.097 0.008 
Age -0.008 0.016 
Service 1 -1.453 -3.358 
Service 2 -1.493 -4.5 
Facility 1 -2.351 -0.307 
Land Use 1 -0.193 -1.213 
Land Use 2 0.044 -1.823 
  
The following equations show the Logit equations for each output. 
Z1 = 2.005 + 0.0097*D - 0.008*A – 1.453*S1 - 1.493*S2 – 2.351* F1 – 0.193*L1 + 0.044*L2 
………………………………………………………………………………Equation 6-5  
Z2 = 3.949 + 0.008*D + 0.016*A – 3.358*S1– 4.5*S2 – 0.307* F1 – 1.213*L1 + 1.823*L2       
………………………………………………………………………………Equation 6-6 
Z3 = 0 (Reference Category) ……………………………………………….Equation 6-7 
Where; D is the pipeline diameter in inches, A is the pipeline age by year, S is the service 
type, F is the facility and L is the land use. The probability of each output is calculated by 
the following equations (Agresti, 2002). 
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     …………………………...……..Equation 6-8 
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        ………………………………….Equation 6-9 
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      ………………………………Equation 6-10 
Where; e = the natural logarithm. The previous equations can be used to determine the 




6.2.2 Model Validation  
To measure the accuracy of the predictions provided by the developed Multinomial Logit 
Model, we applied the generated equations to Data Set 1 (Test). The outputs from the 
equations are compared to the actual failure cause, thereby calculating the percentage of 
correct predictions. We found that 39 out of 57 accidents were correctly identified, or correct 
predictions 68.5% of the time. The model also shows an Average Validity Percentage of 
73.69% and an Average of Invalidity Percentage of 26.31%. The actual outputs versus the 
predicted outputs are represented in figure 6.1. 
 
Figure 6-1 Actual versus Predicted Outputs 
6.2.3 Sensitivity Analysis 
A sensitivity analysis was performed, similar to that done for the artificial neural network 
models, to identify the effect of varying each predictor on the failure cause. The following 
shows the effect of varying each predictor of the MNL model. 
a. Effect of Service Variation 
As shown in figure 6.2, changing the type of transported product has a direct effect on the 













happens due to third-party causes, while when the transported product was crude oil or hot 
products, the failure cause changes to corrosion because  the impurities and heat of these 
types of product induce corrosion. This aspect also follows the same trend as the ANN 
model. 
 
Figure 6-2 Failure Cause versus Service Type 
b. Effect of Facility Variation 
Figure 6.3 indicates that the position of a pipeline, either aboveground or buried, affects the 
failure type that could menace it, buried pipelines are more vulnerable to third-party failure 
and above-ground pipelines are more vulnerable to mechanical failure. 
 
Figure 6-3 Failure Cause versus Facility Type 
c. Effect of Land Use Variation 
The change of land use did not display any effect on the output in our evaluation, but when 
the service type changed from white product to crude oil a significant effect appeared, as 
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Figure 6-4 Failure Cause versus Land Use Variation 
d. Effect of Diameter Variation 
Examining the effect of pipe diameters indicated that it has an effect on the failure cause; 
small diameter pipelines are more susceptible to third-party failure while when larger 
diameter pipelines are more likely to experience mechanical failure, as shown in figure 6.5. 
 
Figure 6-5 Failure Cause versus Diameter Size 
e. Effect of Age Variation  
Figure 6.6 shows the effect of the age variation on the failure cause. The figure shows that 
for newer pipelines, mechanical failure has the highest probability, while for older pipelines 
third-party failure has the highest probability. 
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Failure Cause Variartion vs
Age at Diameter 30 inch
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6.3 Models’ Summary 
The different approaches used in this research (ANN and MNL) had similar results, as 
displayed in table 6.5. The multinomial logit model developed for this study was used to 
calculate the probability of each major type of failure that threatens pipelines, given five 
pipeline attributes. By knowing the probability of each failure type, we could identify the 
failure cause that would be most likely to threat a pipeline; the failure cause with the highest 
probability. The results show the the model has an accuracy of 68.5% --  which is fairly 
good for a model developed from pure historical data. This model has two obvious 
advantages over the ANN model: 
 The MNL  model utilizes  an equation, which makes it easy to use for pipeline 
operators. 
 The MNL model gives the probability of each failure cause, which can help 
operators to have a better idea about a pipeline’s condition. 
 
Table 6-5 Models Summary 














ANN 72.2% 72.8%  
Service and 
Diameter 
2   (3 
Outputs) 






The true capacity of the developed models can be revealed by considering how they are 
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neatly fitted at the very beginning of the costly and time consuming inspection process. An 
example of these models usage is when an oil company intends to inspect one of the lines, 
through knowing the age, diameter, product type, land use and location, the company would 
use the model to pin point expected failures in the line, and consecutively plan their course 
of action. For example by knowing that a 10 years old pipe with a diameter of 40 inch above 
ground carrying fuel oil (Hot) in industrial area, the model would indicate that this pipe is 
likely to fail due to corrosion. This would dictate a course of action that examines the degree 
corrosion using ILI and accordingly plan the suitable corrective actions. In a different case, 
the input might result in predicting a third party failure, which would direct the company 
towards a different course of action. These cases reveal the importance of using this model, 















7 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
7.1 Conclusions  
The present research proposes an objective failure prediction model for oil pipelines built on 
historical data from real failure incidents. This model will help decision makers and oil 
pipeline operators to plan the strategies and actions required to maintain a pipeline in safe 
operating condition by knowing the threats that any particular pipeline would be faced with. 
This research implemented three different failure prediction models using two different 
approaches (ANN and MNL) to predict the types of failure menacing a pipeline based on 
specific physical, operational and environmental factors. The first two models (1-A and 1-B) 
were developed using the ANN technique. Model 1-A is able to predict a failure type among 
three different types of failure (mechanical, corrosion, third party failure) with an accuracy 
of 68.5%, which is fairly good and acceptable for such a model based exclusively on 
historical data. While model 1-B is designed to predict failure caused by either corrosion or 
third-party damage, and does so with an accuracy of 72.2%. This small increase in accuracy 
is not high enough to exclude mechanical failure, and therefore Model 1-A is more 
advantageous, as it can predict failure among the three failure types that are the main cause 
of 88% of oil pipeline accidents. 
The MNL approach was used to develop the third model (model 2), whose results are very 
similar to those of model (1-A) in predicting three types of failure, with a prediction 
accuracy of 68.4%. The MNL model generates equations that calculate the probability of 
each type of failure, which is very helpful for decision makers.  
This study also determined that the type of transported product has the highest impact on the 
failure types, while pipeline age has no significant effect on the type of failure. All three 
models supported this conclusion. The models developed here can help to reduce 
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unnecessary inspections, as they can be prioritised. These models provide a clear view of the 
risks that threaten a pipeline, allowing decision makers to take some actions to reduce those 
risks and keep the pipeline in safe condition.  
7.2 Research Contributions 
The contributions of this research to the current oil pipeline condition assessments process 
are that it: 
 Develops an ANN failure prediction model for oil pipelines that helps to forecast 
mechanical, corrosion or third-party failure; 
 Develops an ANN prediction model for oil pipelines that anticipates either corrosion 
or third-party failure; and 
 Develops an MNL model to predict for oil pipeline mechanical, corrosion or third 
party-failure. 
The added value of this research is the development of an objective failure prediction 
model capable of predicting different types of failure from some basic pipeline 
attributes. This is the only model that can predict different types of oil pipeline failure 
objectively, based only on historical data.  
7.3 Models’ Limitations 
The developed models still have some limitations which are described below: 
 The developed models are only for oil pipelines;  
 The models are only valid for main oil pipelines, which are made of carbon 
steel; 
 These models are not suitable for offshore pipelines; and 




7.4 Recommendations and Future Works 
Recommendations for the extension of this research can be summarized as follows: 
Current research enhancement areas: 
 To enhance the model accuracy more predictors could be added, such as steel grade, 
type of soil and effectiveness of cathodic protection, which have a direct effect on 
corrosion failure. Adding the area population and proximity of highways could 
improve the prediction of third-party failure. In general, adding more predictors will 
improve the models’ accuracy.  
 More historical data would also enhance the developed model. This could be done by 
gathering more data from additional pipeline operators in different regions.  
 The ANN models could be integrated with Fuzzy Theory (NeuroFuzzy). This 
approach will allow expert evaluations to be used for some predictors that do not 
exist in historical data; thereby enriching the models’ accuracy. 
Current study extension: 
 Develop a failure prediction model that can predict all of the failure causes listed by 
CONCAWE by adding more predictors related to operational failure and natural 
failure. 
 Develop an integrated model for oil and gas pipelines. This could be achieved by 
adding the capacity for historical data for gas pipelines. The type of transported 
product would then include gas and predictors relevant to gas pipelines added;  their 
values could simply be set to zero if an oil pipeline is being evaluated. 
 Design a condition scale for oil and gas pipelines, which reflects the state of 
deterioration of a pipeline using a scale from 0 to 10 where 0 is the worst condition 
and 10 is the best state. This scale could be developed using expert opinions to 
evaluate pipeline condition. 
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 Develop a condition assessment model for oil and gas pipelines. This model would 
give the condition of a pipeline as the output which would help decision makers to 
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LIST OF ACCIDENTS HAPPENED TO OIL 
PIPELINE IN THE LAST 38 YEARS REPORTED IN 










Service  Facility 
1 Crude oil                                                               1           Underground pipe 
2 White product  2  Above ground pipe 
3 Fuel oil (hot)                                                         3      Pump station 
4 Crude oil or product 
5 Lubes (hot) Facility part 
                                                                                            1 Bend 
Leak first  detected  by  2   Joint 
1 R/W surveillance by pipeline staff       3           Pipe run 
2 Routine monitoring P/L operator 4  Valve 
3 Automatic detection system 5  Pump 
4 Pressure testing  6  Pig trap 
5 Outside party 7  Small bore 
6 Internal Inspection 8  unknown 
 
Land use  Reason 
1 Residential high density 1  Incorrect design 
2 Residential low density 2  Faulty material 
3 Agricultural 3  Incorrect material specification 
4 Industrial or commercial 4  Age or fatigue 
5 Forest Hills 5  Faulty weld 
6 Barren 6  Construction damage 
7 Water body  7  Incorrect installation 
                                                                                               8 Equipment 
                                                                                               9 Instrument & control systems 
 10 Not depressurised or drained 
 11 Incorrect operation 
                                                                                               12 Incorrect maintenance or construction 
                                                                                               13 Incorrect procedure 
                                                                                               14 Coating failure 
                                                                                               15 Cathodic protection failure 
                                                                                               16 Inhibitor failure 
                                                                                               17 Construction 
                                                                                               18 Agricultural 
                                                                                               19 Underground infrastructure 
                                                                                               20 Landslide 
                                                                                               21 Subsidence 
                                                                                               22 Earthquake 
                                                                                               23 Flooding 
   24 Terrorist activity 
                                                                                               25 Vandalism 
 26 Theft (incl. attempted) 
 
               Categories of spillage causes 
 
Main Secondary 
A b c 
A Mechanical Failure Design & Materials Construction  
B Operational System Human  
C Corrosion External Internal Stress Corrosion 
D Natural Hazard Ground movement Other  
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1 Inspection Techniques 
In the last decade a variety of technologies have been developed; to assess pipeline 
conditions and to accurately detect any metal loss. Most of the new developed 
technologies are for inline inspection. Pipeline inspection categories are illustrated in 
figure 2.4. 
 






Figure 0-1 Oil and Gas Pipeline Inspection Techniques 
 
External Inspection for Pipeline 
The majority of aging pipelines cannot be internally inspected ( unpiggable) due to the 
absence of pig launcher or receiver. That makes external inspection the only way to 
assess these pipelines (Ali, 2011). External inspection is also used for offshore pipelines 
to observe external data such as sea bed activity. 
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External Inspection for Offshore Pipeline 
Remote Operated Vehicle R.O.V. 
ROV is an underwater robot that allows vehicle operators to remain a safe place while the 
vehicle works in the hazardous environment below. ROV is a vehicle connected to the 
control van and the operator on the surface by an umbilical cable which carries the power 
and control signals to the vehicle. This cable also conveys the sensory data back to the 
operator topside. ROV system is also comprised of; a handling system to control dynamic 
cables, a launch system and associated power supplies (Remotely Operated Vehicle 
Comittee of the Marine Technologie Socitey, 2011). The cost of ROV per hour including 
the operation ship is 80$ (Husein, 2011). 
ROV can detect several types of defects for pipelines such as (Ali, 2011): 
 Cathodic protection. 
 Visual external condition. 
 Free span existence. 
 Dents existence. 
 Detect leak. 
 Sea bed profile. 
ROV is a non-expensive and safe inspection techniques but it does not give any 




Figure 0-2 ROV (Remotely Operated Vehicle Comittee of the Marine Technologie Socitey, 2011) 
 
The Autonomous Underwater Vehicle AUV 
AUV is similar to ROV but it not attached with cable to the vessel, which gives AUV the 
advantage to run freely around the pipeline guided with integrated GPS. It is comprised 
of a battery and it is usually equipped with a sonar camera and a data storage system. It is 
a safe inspection technique it does not require system shut down (Teledyne Gavia). 
AUV can detect the following pipeline conditions: 
 Cathodic protection. 
 Visual external condition. 
 Free span existence. 
 Dents existence. 
 Leak detection. 




Figure 0-3  shows the composition of an AUV (Teledyne Gavia) 
 
Divers 
Divers are the oldest inspection method for pipelines, they are the best way to inspect 
pipeline externally. Divers are a very expensive. There is a need to perform a number of 
safety procedures to ensure the safety of the diver. Temporary shutdown is mandatory 
before using divers (Ali, 2011). Divers use two underwater inspection techniques, as 
follow: 
General Visual Inspection (GVI) 
This is the most common inspection technique and gives a general impression about the 
pipeline, then a set of important points are chosen to do detailed inspection. 
Close View Inspection (CVI) 
Which is a detailed inspection done for the chosen points selected on the GVI. Divers use 
equipment such as UT to measure the remaining wall thickness of the pipeline or CP 
meter to measure Cathodic protection (Dale, 2002). 
Divers are an expensive inspection solution. A diver cost 200 $ per hour and more for 




Divers can detect and measure all of the following characteristics:  
 Cathodic protection 
 Visual external condition. 
 Free span existence. 
 Dents existence. 
 Leak detection. 
 Remaining Wall thickness using UT. 
 Geometrical measurements and ovality  
External Inspection for Onshore Pipeline 
External inspection for onshore pipelines is usually used for unpigable and above ground 
pipeline. It also used to verify anomalies detected by in line inspection. We will discuss 
in this section the different types of external inspection methods for onshore pipelines. 
Direct Current Voltage Gradient (DCVG)  
DCVG is used mainly for detecting pipeline coating defects that cause external corrosion. 
The technique is based on measuring the voltage gradients in the soil above a 
cathodically protected pipeline. It is suitable for buried pipelines. It can be used across 
asphalt, concrete, desert and rocky terrain. It is also unaffected by stray currents, 
induction and static. DCVG is used for (Southern Cathodic Protection Company, 2007): 
                                                                                                                            
 Accurately locates coating defects. 
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 Estimates defects sizes. 
 Identifies priorities for excavation. 
 Provides data for CP adjustment/upgrading. 
 Enables coating deterioration to be monitored. 
 Confirms electrical continuity and can locate shorts. 
 
Figure 0-4 DCVG inspection and tool (Southern Cathodic Protection Company, 2007) 
 
Close Interval Pipe to Soil Potential CIPS 
CIPS is a technique used for the detailed analysis of cathodic protection systems in 
underground pipelines. A continuous measurement of pipeline potentials is done 
regarding the copper/copper sulphate reference anode. The pipeline potentials are 
recorded with switched on and off potentials to eliminate IR errors in measurements 
caused by current flow (PROTAN, 2007). 
Usually CIPS is done with DCVG by the same inspector who caries both equipment for 
the two tests because usually CP failure exists with coating failure .CIPS is used for 
(PROTAN, 2007): 
 Identification of zones with inadequate cathodic protection levels     
 Identification of zones with excessive cathodic protection levels   
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 Identification of zones with possible defects in coating quality   
 Identification of zones affected by possible electrical interference  
 
       
 
Figure 0-5 CIPS Performance and Results (PROTAN, 2007) 
 
 
Soil Resistivity Test 
 The resistance to the earth of any earth electrode is influenced by the resistivity of the 
surrounding soil. Resistivity of soil depends mainly on the nature of soil and the moisture 
content. Soil resistivity may change with depth, temperature and also vary from place to 
place depending on the strata of soil and rock formation (Johnson, 2006) . Soil resistivity 
is one of the main factors that could cause external corrosion because the lower soil 
resistivity; the higher will be the corrosion. Low soil resistivity is a challenging problem 
for pipeline operators in the gulf especially Saudi Arabia because of the high corrosivety 
of soil at AlSabgha zone (Salah, 2011). 
Wenner four pin method is the most widely used test to determine soil resistivity 
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(Farwest Corrosion Company, 2011). The test is performed by driving four electrodes 
into the ground along a straight line separated with equal distance as shown in figure 2.9. 
Soil resistivity can be calculated as a function from the voltage drop between the center 
pair of pins, with the current flowing between the two outside pins (Lightning and Surge 
Technologies). 
 
Figure 0-6  Wenner 4 Pin Test test (Lightning and Surge Technologies) 
  
Ultrasound Inspection UT. 
Ultra sound is the most common and reliable technique for detecting cracks and metal 
loss in pipeline because it is a direct measurement for wall thickness. UT is not 
interpretation of magnetic field distortion as in MFL. UT uses high frequency sound 
energy to do measurement. A UT inspection system consists of several units, such as 
pulsar /receiver which is an electronic unit that produce high voltage electrical pulses. 
The transducer generates high frequency ultrasonic energy; this sound energy propagates 
through in the form of waves. A discontinuity (such as a crack) in the wave path cause 
that a part of the energy will be reflected back from the flaw surface. The reflected wave 
signal is transformed into an electrical signal by the transducer and is displayed on the 





Figure 0-7 The Ultrasonic Technique (Komura, et al., 2009) 
 
There are several forms of ultrasound devices depending on the position of transmitted 
waves. 
Ultra sound inspection is used for: 
 Measuring the remaining wall thickness 
 Detecting corrosion 
 Detecting cracks 
Eddie Current Test. 
 Eddie current test (ET) is a Non Destructive Test (NDT) with electromagnetic 
technology. It can be used only on conducting materials. An energized coil is brought 
near the surface of steel pipeline that induce the eddy current in the specimen .The 
induced eddy current sets up a magnetic field in the specimen that tend to oppose the 
original magnetic field .The impedance in the coil is alerted when the eddy current is 
distorted by flaws or any material variation. Eddy current test is an external inspection 
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method which makes it suitable for unpiggable pipeline (Bickerstaff, et al.). 
Eddie current is used for the following: 
 Cracks 
 Laminar defects 
 Assessing wall thicknesses 
 
Figure 0-8 Eddy Current Technique (Efunda, 2011) 
 
Acoustic Emission AE 
In this technique one or more ultrasonic transducers are attached to the pipeline 
permanently. Then the sounds generated into the system using computer-based 
instruments are analyzed. There is no pigging needed in that method and the pipeline can 
be tested without taking it out of service or interrupting the product flow. It can be used 
in continuous monitoring with alarm systems . 
AE is used for the following purposes (Bickerstaff, et al.): 
 Crack growth 
  Turbulence (including leakage) 
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 Material changes such as corrosion 
In Line Inspection (ILI) 
Inline inspection contains very accurate techniques for pipeline inspection but it is very 
expensive. In this section we will show the various In line Inspection ILI techniques. 
Gauging Pig 
Intelligent pigs such as ultrasonic pigs or MFL pigs are very expensive and they could be 
damaged or stuck if the internal condition of pipeline is not suitable. Gauging pig is 
usually used for pipelines with no previous pigging history or when there are doubts as to 
the internal pipeline condition. Gauging pig runs into the pipeline to ensure that other 
pigs can traverse the pipeline from the launcher to the receiver. Pipeline gauging detects 
any internal restriction and indicates if a pipeline needs more extensive cleaning pigs. 
Gauging is performed by fitting a pig with aluminum plate, sized to approximately 90% 
of internal pipeline diameter (Pig Tek Limited, 2010) . 
The figure below shows gauging pig with damaged aluminum plate due to debris found 
in the pipeline. 
 





Calliper pigs are used to determine the geometric properties prior of using intelligent 
inspection pigs. Calliper pigs have an array of levers mounted on one of the pig cups. 
Levers are connected to recording device located on the pig body. The body is usually 
60% of the pipeline diameter. The body is combined of flexible cups that allow the pig to 
pass constriction up to 15% of bore. Calliper pigs are very important to use in offshore 
pipeline (Guo, et al., 2005). 
 Cleaning Pig 
A cleaning pig is used for cleaning the pipeline from solid and accumulated debris to 
increase the efficiency of operation they are also commonly used before intelligent piging 
in order to prevent other pig from being stuck. They use rotary wire wheel brushes (Guo, 
et al., 2005) 
Magnetic Flux Leakage MFL 
MFL could be used for oil and gas pipeline. The technology is based on creating a 
magnetic field between the tool (pig) and the pipe wall. Magnetic flux will leak out the 
pipe wall if there is any defect. The relative magnitude of the signal depends on the 
strength of permanent magnet, the wall thickness and the proximity of sensor device 
(Russell, et al.). MFL is used to detect internal and external corrosions. It works by 
magnetizing the pipe wall near saturation flux density that generates a steady magnetic 
field. If there are any corrosions, pits or cracks the field that will come out will indicate 
the amount of leakage of field and will be measured by sensors.   The output data from 
the sensors is analysed by experts to calculate the amount of metal loss. 
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Pipelines should be cleaned before using the MFL because sensors should be very close 
to the wall thickness and sensors could be damaged if pipeline is not cleaned. Calibre pig 
should also be used to check pipeline pigability and valves prior to MFL (Russell, et al.). 
MFL is influenced by tool and sensor lift off, tool speed, line pressures, corrosion pits, 
and welds. In general the MFL has low sensitivity to external defects and poor sensitivity 
to cracks (Mergelas, et al., 2007) 
Despite the fact that magnetic flux is less accurate than the Ultrasound pig, it is preferable 




Figure 0-10 MFL Composition ( (Pacicif L.A Marine Terminal, 2011) 
 
MFL is used for the following (Bickerstaff, et al.): 
 Detecting missing material, whether iron that has actually been removed or 
corrosion that - turns steel into non-ferromagnetic iron oxide. 
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 Detecting anomaly geometry or mechanical damage. 
Ultrasonic Pig  (U.T.) 
Ultrasonic technology is used sometimes because MFL is not accurate enough to 
calculate the remaining the strength well enough, although Ultrasonic technology is more 
expensive and need liquid filled pipeline (Teitsma, 2004). Ultrasonic technology uses 
sound waves of short wave length with high frequency to detect flaws or measure wall 
thickness (Bickerstaff, et al.).  
Ultrasonic technology can detect and measure stress corrosion cracking (SCC). As we 
mentioned before conventional Ultrasonic pig cannot inspect gas pipeline because it 
needs liquid coupling to get signal in and out the wall. To overcome this problem 
ultrasound pig could be injected into pipeline in a liquid slug (Teitsma, 2004). 
UT is used for the following (Bickerstaff, et al.): 
 Internal/External metal loss 




 Laminations (sloping & hydrogen induced) 
 Cracking 
 Weld characteristics 
 Wall thickness variations 
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 Usable on bends, tees, and valves 
 Invista Inspection 
This is an ultra sound in line inspection tool designed for unpiggable pipeline. It is used 
now by several pipeline operators in gulf such as ARAMCO and Qatar Petroleum (Ali, 
2011). Usually unpigable pipelines have small diameters, sharp elbows and reduced port 
valves. To overcome this problem Quest Company has designed InVista pig with small 
diameter (3 inches) and high flexibility. InVista uses ultrasonic sensors to detect wall 
thickness loss and cracking with high accuracy (Quest Integrity Group, 2011). 
 
Figure 0-11 Invista Tool Dealing With Sharp Elbow (Quest Integrity Group, 2011) 
 
Electromagnetic Acoustic Transducer EMAT  
EMAT pigs were developed to detect and measure cracks specially Stress Corrosion 
Cracking SCC. EMATS pigs generates Ultrasound waves but without contacting the 
pipeline surface to do so. EMAT consists of a coil in a magnetic field placed at the 
internal surface of the pipe wall. This coil induces alternating current in the pipeline wall, 
causing Lorentz forces (forces acting on moving charges in magnetic fields), which 
generate ultrasound. It works by the same technique of ultrasonic except the way of 
generating ultrasound waves. One of the main advantages of this technique that it does 
not need a gas coupling to inspect gas pipelines and it gives results more accurate than 
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MFL results. That makes it usable at gas pipeline (Teitsma, 2004). 
EMAT is used for the following:. 
 Internal/External metal loss 
 Longitudinal channelling 
 Blisters/Inclusions 
 Deformations 
 Laminations (sloping & hydrogen induced) Cracking  
 Weld characteristics 
 Wall thickness variations 
Elastic Wave Vehicle  
Elastic wave vehicle was developed in 1993. It uses liquid filled wheel to inject 
ultrasound into the pipeline wall in the circumferential direction. EWV can detect cracks 
larger than 25% of the pipeline wall thickness and greater than 2” long. It also has good 
results in detecting coating disbondment. It is also effective in detecting stress corrosion 
cracking. However it generates many false positives that need too much verification digs 
(Teitsma, 2004). 
EWV is used for the following : 
 Stress corrosion cracks SCC. 




Remote Field Eddy Current REFC 
This technique is suitable for unpiggable pipeline because its entire component can be 
made much smaller than the pipeline to be inspected. In this technique the current 
transmitted by the exciter coil is received by the sensor coil which can determine any 
defect represented by any change in the field propagation.  The main disadvantages of the 





























































































output 1 58 25.0% 
2 69 29.7% 
3 105 45.3% 
service 1 64 27.6% 
2 142 61.2% 
3 26 11.2% 
facility  1 213 91.8% 
2 19 8.2% 
land use 1 153 65.9% 
2 12 5.2% 
3 67 28.9% 
Valid 232 100.0% 
Missing 0  




a. The dependent variable has only one value observed in 












Square Df Sig. 
Intercept Only 489.091    


























Square df Sig. 
Intercept 387.592
a
 .000 0 . 
age 389.872 2.279 2 .320 
diainch 399.623 12.031 2 .002 
service 436.608 49.016 4 .000 
facility 404.405 16.813 2 .000 
landuse 398.546 10.954 4 .027 
The chi-square statistic is the difference in -2 log-likelihoods 
between the final model and a reduced model. The reduced 
model is formed by omitting an effect from the final model. 
The null hypothesis is that all parameters of that effect are 0. 
a. This reduced model is equivalent to the final model 















 B Std. Error Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
95% Confidence Interval for 
Exp(B) 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 Intercept 2.005 1.495 1.798 1 .180    
Age -.008 .015 .313 1 .576 .992 .963 1.021 
diainch .097 .032 9.249 1 .002 1.102 1.035 1.173 
[service=1] -1.453 1.326 1.201 1 .273 .234 .017 3.144 
[service=2] -1.493 1.277 1.366 1 .242 .225 .018 2.746 
[service=3] 0
b
 . . 0 . . . . 
[facility=1] -2.351 .703 11.169 1 .001 .095 .024 .378 
[facility=2] 0
b
 . . 0 . . . . 
[landuse=1] -.193 .444 .190 1 .663 .824 .345 1.968 
[landuse=2] .044 .798 .003 1 .956 1.045 .219 4.993 
[landuse=3] 0
b
 . . 0 . . . . 
2 Intercept 3.949 1.438 7.543 1 .006    
Age .016 .014 1.292 1 .256 1.016 .988 1.046 
diainch .008 .033 .057 1 .812 1.008 .944 1.076 
[service=1] -3.358 1.103 9.263 1 .002 .035 .004 .303 
[service=2] -4.500 1.076 17.485 1 .000 .011 .001 .092 
[service=3] 0
b
 . . 0 . . . . 
[facility=1] -.307 .908 .115 1 .735 .735 .124 4.359 
[facility=2] 0
b
 . . 0 . . . . 
[landuse=1] -1.213 .411 8.717 1 .003 .297 .133 .665 
[landuse=2] -1.823 1.122 2.637 1 .104 .162 .018 1.458 
[landuse=3] 0
b






 B Std. Error Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
95% Confidence Interval for 
Exp(B) 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 Intercept 2.005 1.495 1.798 1 .180    
Age -.008 .015 .313 1 .576 .992 .963 1.021 
diainch .097 .032 9.249 1 .002 1.102 1.035 1.173 
[service=1] -1.453 1.326 1.201 1 .273 .234 .017 3.144 
[service=2] -1.493 1.277 1.366 1 .242 .225 .018 2.746 
[service=3] 0
b
 . . 0 . . . . 
[facility=1] -2.351 .703 11.169 1 .001 .095 .024 .378 
[facility=2] 0
b
 . . 0 . . . . 
[landuse=1] -.193 .444 .190 1 .663 .824 .345 1.968 
[landuse=2] .044 .798 .003 1 .956 1.045 .219 4.993 
[landuse=3] 0
b
 . . 0 . . . . 
2 Intercept 3.949 1.438 7.543 1 .006    
Age .016 .014 1.292 1 .256 1.016 .988 1.046 
diainch .008 .033 .057 1 .812 1.008 .944 1.076 
[service=1] -3.358 1.103 9.263 1 .002 .035 .004 .303 
[service=2] -4.500 1.076 17.485 1 .000 .011 .001 .092 
[service=3] 0
b
 . . 0 . . . . 
[facility=1] -.307 .908 .115 1 .735 .735 .124 4.359 
[facility=2] 0
b
 . . 0 . . . . 
[landuse=1] -1.213 .411 8.717 1 .003 .297 .133 .665 
[landuse=2] -1.823 1.122 2.637 1 .104 .162 .018 1.458 
[landuse=3] 0
b
 . . 0 . . . . 
a. The reference category is: 3. 





1 2 3 Percent Correct 
1 25 4 29 43.1% 
2 5 33 31 47.8% 
3 6 6 93 88.6% 
Overall Percentage 15.5% 18.5% 65.9% 65.1% 
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